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ABSTRACT 
Organizations today gather unprecedented quantities of data from their operations. 
This data is coming from transactions made by a person or from a connected 
system/application. From personal devices to industry including government, the 
internet has become the primary means of modern communication, further increasing 
the need for a method to track and secure these devices. Protecting the integrity of 
connected devices collecting data is critical to ensure the trustworthiness of the 
system. An organization must not only know the identity of the users on their 
networks and have the capability of tracing the actions performed by a user but they 
must trust the system providing them with this knowledge.  This increase in the pace 
of usage of personal devices along with a lack of trust in the internet has driven 
demand for trusted digital identities. As the world becomes increasingly mobile with 
the number of smart phone users growing annually and the mobile web flourishing, it 
is critical to implement strong security on mobile devices. To manage the vast number 
of devices and feel confident that a machine’s identity is verifiable, companies need to 
deploy digital credentialing systems with a strong root of trust. As passwords are not a 
secure method of authentication, mobile devices and other forms of IoT require a 
means of two-factor authentication that meets NIST standards. Traditionally, this has 
been done with Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) through the use of a smart card. 
Blockchain technologies combined with PKI can be utilized in such a way as to 
provide an identity and access management solution for the internet of things (IoT). 
Improvements to the security of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology 
and various implementations of blockchain make viable options for managing the 
identity and access of IoT devices. When PKI first began over two decades ago, it 
required the use of a smart card with a set of credentials known as the personal 
identity verification (PIV) card. The PIV card (something you have) along with a 
personal identification number (PIN) (something you know) were used to implement 
two-factor authentication. Over time the use of the PIV cards has proven challenging 
as mobile devices lack the integrated smart card readers found in laptop and desktop 
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computers. Near Field Communication (NFC) capability in most smart phones and 
mobile devices provides a mechanism to allow a PIV card to be read by a mobile 
device. In addition, the existing PKI system must be updated to meet the demands of a 
mobile focused internet. Blockchain technology is the key to modernizing PKI. 
Together, blockchain-based PKI and NFC will provide an IoT solution that will allow 
industry, government, and individuals a foundation of trust in the world wide web that 
is lacking today.  
Keywords—Blockchain technology, Identity, Credential, and Access Management (ICAM), Internet of 
Things (IoT), Mobile Devices, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), Near Field Communication (NFC), 
smart card. 
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CHAPTER 1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of the Problem 
Despite almost all of our daily activities involving the internet, the internet has no 
trusted digital identity (Stokkink & Pouwelse, 2018). Currently, cyberspace is the one domain 
a person can literally be anything or anyone they choose. Social media accounts are self-
sovereign meaning the user controls their credentials. The user creates a name, a birthdate, 
address, and career. Some are authentic. Some are fake. There is no way to validate a person 
is who they say they are in a self-sovereign system. In an ideal world, we would all trust each 
other. In the world as we know it, we are constantly bombarded with phishing emails, fake 
websites, and other forms of social engineering to scam us in one way or another. Across the 
globe more than two out of five consumers have been the victim to a fraudulent online 
incident. The United States (US) has the highest rates when compared to the rest of the world. 
Over fifty percent of businesses worldwide saw an increase in fraud over the last year, while 
over eighty percent of US businesses reported an increase (Experian, 2019). Individuals, 
businesses, and government have a strong desire and need for trusted digital identities 
(Stokkink & Pouwelse, 2018). 
 Most online identity verification is done through the use of a password. Passwords are 
a form of single factor authentication (SFA) which means only one method of identifying an 
individual’s request for access is given. Passwords are used for logging into social media 
accounts, bank accounts, email accounts, and online shopping accounts. We are encouraged to 
use a strong password and make it unique for every online service. Most major industry such 
as governments, Universities, and financial institutions follow the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) guidelines regarding secure passwords. These guidelines 
typically required strong passwords with a minimum length of fourteen characters that are a 
combination of letters, numbers and special characters. Despite password creation 
requirements, passwords remain weak and easily deducible because people continue to use 
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predictable patterns and common words, such as names and birth dates (L. Bosnjak, 2018). 
There are many limitations on passwords or single-factor authentication such as: 
• Password Capture –there are many methods of obtaining passwords. 
• Keylogger malware – captures a user’s keystrokes. 
• Social engineering to manipulate a person’s password through phishing emails, fake 
websites, social networks, phone calls, or other similar methods. 
• Gaining access to unencrypted or weakly encrypted stored passwords. 
• Passwords that are written down. 
• Password Guessing – Using default passwords, dictionary words, and other probable 
passwords over and over to attempt authentication. 
• Password Cracking – Using analysis and cryptographic password hashes to reveal the 
password. 
• Password Resetting – Using interception or manipulation to reset a user’s existing 
password (Ferraiolo, Cooper, Regenscheid, Scarfone, & Souppaya, 2016). 
These are all reasonable threats that a hacker can exploit to obtain unauthorized access 
to a system or network and have that users’ rights. Most hackers target administrators and 
others who have high level privileges in a system in order to be most effective with their 
attack because once an attacker has gained access into a system, the practice is similar every 
time:  
• Establish continued access. 
• Escalate or obtain administrator privileges. 
• Network mapping. 
• Port scanning to find open ports. 
• Locate valued data – sometimes hard to determine and sometimes already known what 
to look for. 
• Retrieve the data. 
• Remain undetected for as long as possible (Verizon, 2019). 
In 2018, approximately 330 million Twitter accounts had their passwords exposed in 
plain text, GOMO app had the information of approximately 50.5 million users exposed on a 
publicly accessible server via port 80 with no login requirement, and 1.5 million medical 
records were exposed from a password hacking breach (ENISA, 2019). According to studies 
conducted by Crowd Research Partners in 2018, the most common culprit of insider threat is 
accidental exposure by employees. They found the accidental breeches were due 56% to weak 
or reused passwords, no passwords accounted for 44%, and password sharing practices 
accounted for 44% for insider threats (Crowd Research Partners, 2019). Hacktivists, people 
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who gain unauthorized access computer files or networks in order to further social or political 
ends, used SQL injection, unpatched system vulnerabilities, and password stealing as their 
main techniques to hack a website. LokiPWS, a webbot used as a password stealer, 
distribution increased by more than 300% and data breaches increased by 28% in 2018 
(ENISA, 2019). Then there are other well-known password stealers such as Mimikatz 
(WatchGuard, 2018). Last year, one could find approximately 500,000 email accounts with 
passwords that were priced at US $90 in the Dark Web (ENISA, 2019). 
 The events of 2018 reveal that re-using the same password in various services is a 
serious security issue and should be avoided. It is also evident that passwords are not the 
optimal method of preventing entry. We have long been aware of password weakness. Back 
in 2012, LinkedIn lost 117 million passwords hashed with SHA-1. This stimulated a thorough 
analysis of how government and military employees use passwords compared to other 
organizations by WatchGuard Technologies, Inc. Government employees are considered to 
follow strong password practices typically greater than the rest of the population. For this 
study, the Security Analysts used the 55 million hashes obtained from the 117 million leaked 
and using the well-known dictionary realuniq.lst from CrackStation.net were able to crack 
52% of them. Out of these they accounted for government addresses based on their emails 
identified by “.gov” or “.mil” and were able to crack 50% of them in under two days. The 
results determined that government and military users were only 2% better at picking strong 
passwords than non-government and military users (WatchGuard, 2018).  
The cognizance of password weakness has become so popular that NIST made some 
controversial changes to their password guidelines with the release of Special Publication 
800-63-3. They basically stated to try not to use passwords at all. NIST removed the periodic 
password change requirements as well as the password complexity requirement of mixing 
letters (upper & lower case), symbols, and numbers (Paul A. Grassi, 2017). Password-only 
authentication is not adequate for an application; therefore, it is recommended to use it in 
combination with other security mechanisms. The European Union Agency for Network and 
Information Security (ENISA) recommends enabling two factor-authentication whenever 
applicable as two factor-authentication can prevent account takeover (ENISA, 2019). Two-
factor authentication can mitigate or lessen the exposure to lost or stolen passwords (Verizon, 
2018). Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) has sustained itself over the past 20 years as the de 
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facto standard for providing electronic trust via two-factor authentication (2FA) for desktop 
and other stationary devices (Ragjendran, 2017).  
1.2 Statement of the problem 
The pace of usage of personal devices has increased within industry, driving demand 
for trusted digital identities. As the world becomes increasingly mobile with the number of 
smart phone users growing annually and the mobile web flourishing, it is critical to implement 
strong security on mobile devices. As passwords and OTPs are not a secure method of 
authentication, mobile devices and other forms of IoT require a means of two-factor 
authentication that meet NIST standards. When PKI first began over two decades ago, it 
required the use of a smart card with a set of credentials known as the personal identity 
verification (PIV) card. The PIV card (something you have) along with a personal 
identification number (PIN) (something you know) were used to implement two-factor 
authentication. Over time the use of the PIV cards has proven challenging as mobile devices 
lack the integrated smart card readers found in laptop and desktop computers. In addition, the 
existing PKI system must be updated to meet the demands of a mobile focused internet. 
1.3 Objectives of the project 
The objectives of this project are to update the existing PKI framework to provide a 
secure means of authentication utilizing the PIV card when accessed from a mobile device. 
Currently, non-mobile electronics utilize Public Key Infrastructure as a method of 2FA. A 
USB smartcard reader allows those sitting in front of a laptop or desktop computer the 
capability of providing 2FA. Utilizing the near field communication (NFC) functionality built 
into most smart phones provides a method to develop authenticating with something you have 
and something you know from a mobile device meeting the requirements of 2FA. The NFC 
capabilities within smartphones allows an adequate replacement for USB smartcard readers. 
Improving on the existing centralized PKI framework by decentralizing it through blockchain 
technology, a new PKI framework will provide a secure method of authentication. This 
research will answer the question on how PKI can be improved to provide a trusted digital 
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identity for mobile devices. The research will break down the overarching question to find 
answers to these questions: 
 Digital Identity 
• Can an identity be verified as belonging to a real person or thing supplying the digital 
identity? 
• Can a claimed identity be securely linked to a single, unique identity? 
• Can the evidence supplied by an identity be validated as genuine (e.g. not counterfeit or 
spoofed)? 
• Can the digital identity be validated as existing in the real world? 
 NFC 
• Can the encryption size be reduced to fit on an NFC card? 
• Can a smartphone with NFC enabled be a smart card reader? 
• Is there a secure communication channel between the card and device? 
• What drain is there on the battery life? 
• Can the existing standard PKCS #11 which specifies an interface to cryptographic smart 
cards be used? 
• Can the existing standard PKCS #12 which specifies a format that allows storing and 
transferring security-sensitive data such as private keys and certificates be used? 
 Blockchain 
• Can PKI become a distributed system with blockchain? 
• Can blockchain allow separate PKI systems to function as one? 
• Can blockchain perform identity brokering? 
• Can PKI systems from competitors be trusted? 
• Can PKI provide a trusted identity for the internet? 
• Can blockchain provide a trusted third-party certification authority? 
• Can the size of the blockchain be hosted by enough peers? 
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CHAPTER 2 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 AUTHENTICATION 
In order to ensure that a user on a network is genuine, there must be a method of 
identifying them. The data being transferred across a network as well as the systems on a 
network need to be identified as well. Origin, destination, time of transmission/reception, 
content and so on are data items requiring integrity preservation (Batten, 2012). The process 
of ensuring trust in a user, system, or data is called authentication. An authentication factor is 
a way of confirming the identity of a subject. The three authentication factors are “something 
you know”, “something you have”, and “something you are.” “something you know” is 
defined as an item that the subject has knowledge of, “something you have” is an item that is 
in the possession of the subject, and “something you are” is a biometric characteristic of the 
subject. Single-factor authentication is the act of identifying a user as authentic with one out 
of three of the authentication factors. Two-factor authentication is the act of identifying a user 
as authentic with two out of three of the authentication factors. Multi-factor authentication is 
the act of identifying a user as authentic using all three authentication factors. The more 
authentication factors used for authentication the stronger the security and trust in the 
subject’s identity (Ballad, Ballad, & Banks, 2011). 
2.2 DIGITAL IDENTITY 
The built-in anonymity of cyberspace makes identity one of the largest challenges that 
cybersecurity experts face (Rivera, Robledo, Larios, & Avalos, 2017). Managing and having 
trust in the identity of a user is desired knowledge by governments, industry, and individuals. 
In the technologically rooted social and business environments of the modern world, identity 
can be faked or impersonated. People want to know that the cute person they have been 
chatting with on social media or flirting with on dating sites is who they say they are. People 
want to trust that the email they just opened is really from their bank as it claims. Industry and 
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governments want to know that the person they allowed onto their network or access to their 
websites is who they say they are.  A digital identity sometimes referred to as an electronic 
identification (eID) is the cyberspace equivalent to a person or entities real life identity. An 
entity can be industry, government, or a thing. Basically, anything that connects to a network 
requires a digital identity. The Oxford Dictionary (Oxford, 2019) defines identity as: 
• The fact of being who or what a person or thing is. 
• The characteristics determining who or what a person or things is. 
• [as modifier] (of an object) serving to establish who the holder, owner, or wearer is by 
bearing their name and often other details such as a signature or photograph. 
• A close similarity or affinity 
• (also identity operation) 
• An element of a set which, if combined with another element by a specified binary 
operation, leaves that element unchanged. 
• The equality of two expressions for all values of the quantities expressed by letters, or 
an equation expressing this, e.g. (x+1)2 = x2 + 2x + 1. 
Therefore, a digital identity can be expressed as the fact of being who or what a person or 
thing is online. A digital identity is the characteristics determining who or what a person or 
thing is online. Or serving to establish who the holder, owner, or wearer is by bearing their 
name and often other details such as a signature or photograph online. 
2.3 Cryptography 
Cryptography is the science of securing data. There is a long history throughout the 
centuries of obscuring messages to prevent unwanted parties from reading them. The process 
of encoding a message in such a way that makes it unreadable to those not authorized is called 
encryption. Modern cryptography is founded on mathematical theory and computer science 
principles. The purpose of cryptography is to prove three fundamental things about a 
message: authentication, integrity, and confidentiality. Authentication proves that a message 
was sent by who claims to have sent it. Integrity proves that a message has not been altered in 
unauthorized ways. Confidentiality proves that a message is read by only those intended to 
read it (Batten, 2012). 
There are two forms of cryptography: symmetric and asymmetric. Symmetric 
cryptography is a method of encryption where the sender and receiver share the same key. 
Symmetric cryptography utilizes simpler and faster encryption but requires securely 
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exchanging the key which becomes a challenge. Asymmetric cryptography uses a public and 
private key to encrypt and decrypt data. The public key can be shared with anyone. The 
private key is known only to owner (Paar & Pelzl, 2010).  
2.4 Public Key Cryptography 
Public key cryptography is the same as asymmetric cryptography. The two terms can 
be used interchangeably. Public key cryptography began in 1976 with a paper publication by 
Whit Diffie and Martin Hellman describing a method of establishing a common key in a 
secure manner over an insecure channel (Paar & Pelzl, 2010). 
Each entity (person or device) that uses public-key cryptography has a key pair that 
consists of a public key and a private key. Private keys are secret and known only to their 
owners. They are protected by a passphrase and can be stored on separate hardware 
cryptographic devices such as smart cards. Private keys are used for proving the identity of 
the entity. Public keys are made known openly and are distributed to all hosts with which the 
entity wants to securely communicate. The two keys are mathematically dependent but the 
private key cannot be derived from the public key. The data encrypted with the public key can 
only be decrypted with the private key and vice versa. Since the public key is shared freely a 
method to ensure the authenticity of the public key is created through a public key certificate. 
A public key certificate is an electronic document used to prove the ownership of a public 
key. This ensures trust that the public key belongs to the entity it is associated with. This is 
most commonly done using the X.509 standard. X.509 is a standard defining the format of the 
digital certificates used to validate ownership of a public key. This standard allows 
interoperability among numerous tools and applications among vendors (Adams & Lloyd, 
2003).  
 Digital Certificate 
Digital certificates are electronic credentials that binds a user, computer, or service’s 
identity to a public key by providing information about the subject of the certificate, the 
validity of the certificate, and applications and services that can use the certificate. Digital 
certificates can be used for authentication, encryption, and digital signing. Certificates issued 
in PKIs are structured to meet these objectives based on standards established by the Public-
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Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working Group (PKIX) of the Internet Engineering Tasks Force 
(IETF) (Adams & Lloyd, 2003). 
 Root Certificate 
The root certificate is the foundation of trust for PKI which is why it is also called the 
root of trust. In order for a certificate to be trusted it must originate from a trusted source. A 
certificate is signed by a root certificate issued by a program run under strict guidelines. Many 
well-known root certificates are distributed in operating systems such as Microsoft and Apple. 
A root certificate is invaluable because any certificate signed with its private key is 
automatically trusted (Mayes & Markantonakis, 2017). 
 X.509 Certificate 
X.509 is a standard defining the most commonly used format of public key certificates 
through a series of Requests for Comments (RFC). X.509 for PKI follows RFC 5280. Each 
root CA will have a trusted root certificate that is used to sign each key pair generated for 
participates in the PKI system.  The X.509 certificate for PIV authentication and its associated 
private key is defined in FIPS 201 and is used to authenticate the card and the cardholder. The 
PIV authentication private key and its corresponding certificate are accessed solely over the 
contact interface. The control rule for read access is set so that the certificate can always be 
read without any access control restrictions. This cryptographic function is protected with a 
PIN. Without a verified PIN submission there can be no private key operations using the PIV 
Authentication key. The X.509 certificate for digital signature and its associated private key 
support the use of digital signatures such as that utilized for signing documents.   
 Message Authentication Code (MAC) 
A message authentication code (MAC) is used for data integrity. A MAC provides a 
cryptographic checksum that is computed by the sender and appended to the message. The 
receiver will compute a MAC and compare the MAC computed to the MAC attached to the 
message. If they are the same, data integrity can be trusted. If they differ, the data has been 
tampered with in some way (Paar & Pelzl, 2010). Although this technique employs symmetric 
encryption, it depends on a shared key known to both the sender and receiver. Therefore, 
public key cryptography can be used to compute this shared key (Adams & Lloyd, 2003). 
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 Digital Signature 
A digital signature is a means of identifying the sender of a digital message similar to 
the way a written signature on a paper or document proves authorship. Using public key 
cryptography, a sender, Bill, uses his private key to digitally sign a message. The receiver, 
Jill, uses Bill’s public key to confirm the messages signature so that she can trust it came from 
Bill. If Bill wants to send a private message to Jill, Bill encrypts the message with Jill’s public 
key. Only Jill can decrypt the message with her private key ensuring that only Jill reads the 
message. Bill digitally signs the message with his private key so that Jill can assure herself the 
message came from Bill. This is how public key cryptography allows a means of 
authenticating the identity of each other (Batten, 2012). 
2.5 Smart Cards 
A smart card is a piece of plastic with a microprocessor that can read and write data, 
contain a unique identifier, be used to process transactions, and add security. These cards are 
read by a smart card reader. The first plastic cards utilized a magnetic strip. The magnetic 
strip could be seen on every credit and debit card but their use has been replaced with a smart 
card that has a chip (Mayes & Markantonakis, 2017). Today’s credit and debit cards have 
implemented a chip in addition to the magnetic strip. The smart card that contains a chip hosts 
a small microprocessor between two pieces of plastic that can store and process data via an 
integrated circuit (Chirico, 2014). As security features improved the magnetic strip was not 
seen to be secure as it can be copied therefore magnetic chip cards are no longer seen as smart 
cards as they do not meet smart card security requirements. To meet the modern definition of 
a smart card, the card must: 
• Have a unique identifier, 
• Be capable of use in an automated electronic transaction, 
• Be used primarily as added security 
• Not easily forgeable or able to be copied. 
• Be capable to securely store data, 
• Be capable of running a variety of security algorithms and functions (Oxford, 2019). 
A smart card is tamper resistant and can be used for highly secure storage making it 
beneficial to house secret keys. A smart card implementing the proper security controls is read 
only once written to and therefore cannot be copied and then misused. The ability to have a 
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unique identifier, contain encryption keys, and be tamper resistant makes smart cards the ideal 
option for multi-factor authentication (Hansmann, Nicklous, Schack, & Seliger, 2000). 
           History 
Diners Club started the first credit card in the early 1950s. It was a plastic card that 
had the name of the cardholder printed on the front. With possession of this little plastic card, 
you could buy goods or services on credit at selected hotels or restaurants (Hansmann, 
Nicklous, Schack, & Seliger, 2000). Like all good ideas the plastic card could be forged or 
stolen so protection was implemented by visual features such as security printing and the 
signature panel. Eventually, these rudimentary security features became inadequate and they 
added a magnetic stripe on the back of the card which allowed for digital data to be stored. 
This increased handling costs for merchants and banks by making machine-readable card 
accessories necessary. Banks implemented the additional security feature of requiring a user 
to enter a pin at its automatic teller machines (ATMs) when presenting a debit card. Over 
time, it became apparent the magnetic-stripe technology had a major flaw. The data stored on 
the stripe can be read, deleted and rewritten at will by anyone with access to a suitable 
magnetic card reader/writer (Rankl & Effing, 2010). The idea of the smart card began with a 
patent filed by two German inventors, Jurgen Dethloff and Helmut Grotrupp in 1968. During 
the 1970’s CII-Honeywell-Bull demonstrated the first prototype microprocessor-based smart 
card (Chirico, 2014). In 1974 Roland Moreno recorded his smart card patents that stimulated 
much growth with smart card development. Moreno’s provided the semiconductor industry 
with the means to provide low cost integrated circuit supplies. 
 OpenCard Framework 
The OpenCard Framework (OCF) is a standard Java framework for working with 
smart cards. The OCF is an open source framework found available on the internet at no cost. 
The OCF originated from the OpenCard Consortium through work done by IBM and 
Gemplus (CardContact, 2019). The architecture was created to provide a set of standards and 
commonality for card operating system providers, card terminal vendors, and card issuers 
(Chen, Java Card Technology for Smart Cards, 2000).   
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 Java Card 
The Java Card technology combines a subset of the Java programming language with 
a runtime environment optimized for smart cards and similar small-memory embedded 
devices. The Java Card platform is a smart card platform enabled with Java Card technology 
(also called a “Java Card”). This technology allows for multiple applications to run on a 
single card and provides facilities for secure interoperability of applications. Applications for 
the Java Card platform are called applets (Java Card Applications) (Chirico, 2014).  
 
The Java Card Technology is a virtual machine on a smart card or other tamper-
resistant security chips that utilizes the Java language. The Java Card Virtual Machine 
(JCVM) is split into two parts that consists of a part that runs off-card and the other that runs 
on-card. On the JCVM on-card portion is the Java Card bytecode interpreter. On the off-card 
portion is the Java Card converter (Chen, Java Card Technology for Smart Cards, 2000). The 
Java Card Technology utilizes the JCVM as an operating system that allows Java Card applets 
to run on a variety of smart cards. This is similar to how a Java applet runs on different 
computers (Chirico, 2014). A Java Card may be contact or contactless or both. Contact means 
the smart card uses a chip that houses a microprocessor while contactless means the smart 
card uses embedded integrated circuits that store and process data via near field 
communication (Chen, Java Card Technology for Smart Cards, 2000).  
2.6 Personal Identity Verification (PIV) 
The US Federal government created a Personal Identity Verification (PIV) credential 
to be used to access Federally controlled facilities and information systems. A PIV credential 
uses public key cryptography utilizing a public key certificate following multi-factor 
authentication following something you know, something you have, and something you are. 
The PIV credential is standardized to have specific information using technology w hich is 
interoperable (United States Government, 2019). 
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2.7 Public Key Infrastructure 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is the origin of a persistent security infrastructure 
whose services are implemented and delivered using public key cryptography (Adams & 
Lloyd, 2003). A PKI will provide the policies, roles, software, hardware, and procedures 
necessary to create, manage, distribute, use, store, and revoke digital certificates. The most 
important aspect of PKI is that it establishes the identity of people, devices, and services 
(Ballad, Ballad, & Banks, 2011).  
 
 Registration Authority (RA)  
A registration authority (RA) is the standard name for the entity responsible for initial 
authentication of an individual. The RA’s can be widely dispersed geographically to establish 
and confirm the identity of an individual as part of the initialization process. The identity is 
confirmed via physical presence and associated picture identification such as driver’s license 
or passport. The RA is responsible for the unique association between certificate and person. 
 Credential Service Provider (CSP) 
A credential service provider (CSP) establishes and maintains the enrollment records 
and binding authenticators of a digital identity. They were formed in order to meet the 
challenge of linking a digital identity to a single precise person or thing. A CSP can meet one 
of three identity assurance levels (IALs) (Grassi, et al., 2017).  
• IAL1: Invalid or unverified digital identity. There does not have to be a link to a real 
person or thing. 
• IAL2: There is some proof that the digital identity is real. The proof can be remote or 
physically-present identity proofing. 
• IAL3: The digital identity is verified and validated by an authorized and trained CSP 
representative by the physical presence of the real person or thing (Grassi, et al., 2017). 
The CSP responsibilities are sometimes delegated to a RA where they would maintain 
a close relationship in working together. The responsibilities of the CSP include collecting as 
much evidence as possible to validate an applicant and determine authenticity, validity, and 
accuracy. Identity validation consists of three primary acts: gathering suitable identity 
evidence, sanctioning the evidence is genuine and authentic, and corroborating that the data 
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submitted as identity evidence is real, current and belongs to an actual object. The strength of 
evidence validity criteria is as follows: 
 
Strength Qualities of Identity Evidence 
Unacceptable No acceptable identity evidence provided. 
Weak 
• The issuing source of the evidence did not perform identity proofing. 
• The issuing process for the evidence means that it can reasonably be 
assumed to have been delivered into the possession of the applicant. 
• The evidence contains: 
• At least one reference number that uniquely identifies itself or the 
person to whom it relates, OR 
• The issued identity evidence contains a photograph or biometric 
template (of any modality) of the person to whom it relates. 
Fair • The issuing source of the evidence confirmed the claimed identity 
through an identity proofing process. 
• The issuing process for the evidence means that it can reasonably be 
assumed to have been delivered into the possession of the person to 
whom it relates. 
• The evidence: 
o Contains at least one reference number that uniquely identifies 
the person to whom it relates, OR 
o Contains a photograph or biometric template (any modality) of 
the person to whom it relates, OR 
o Can have ownership confirmed through KBV. 
• Where the evidence includes digital information, that information is 
protected using approved cryptographic or proprietary methods, or 
both, and those methods ensure the integrity of the information and 
enable the authenticity of the claimed issuing source to be confirmed. 
• Where the evidence includes physical security features, it requires 
proprietary knowledge to be able to reproduce it. 
• The issued evidence is unexpired. 
Strong • The issuing source of the evidence confirmed the claimed identity 
through written procedures designed to enable it to form a reasonable 
belief that it knows the real-life identity of the person. Such procedures 
are subject to recurring oversight by regulatory or publicly-accountable 
institutions. For example, the Customer Identification Program 
guidelines established in response to the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 
or the Red Flags Rule, under Section 114 of the Fair and Accurate 
Credit Transaction Act of 2003 
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• (FACT Act). 
• The issuing process for the evidence ensured that it was delivered into 
the possession of the subject to whom it relates. 
• The issued evidence contains at least one reference number that 
uniquely identifies the person to whom it relates. 
• The full name on the issued evidence must be the name that the person 
was officially known by at the time of issuance. Not permitted are 
pseudonyms, aliases, an initial for surname, or initials for all given 
names. 
• The: 
o Issued evidence contains a photograph or biometric template (of 
any modality) of the person to whom it relates, OR 
o Applicant proves possession of an AAL2 authenticator, or 
equivalent, bound to an IAL2 identity, at a minimum. 
• Where the issued evidence includes digital information, that 
information is protected using approved cryptographic or proprietary 
methods, or both, and those methods ensure the integrity of the 
information and enable the authenticity of the claimed issuing source 
to be confirmed. 
• Where the issued evidence contains physical security features, it 
requires proprietary knowledge and proprietary technologies to be able 
to reproduce it. 
• The evidence is unexpired. 
Superior • The issuing source of the evidence confirmed the claimed identity by 
following written procedures designed to enable it to have high 
confidence that the source knows the real-life identity of the subject. 
Such procedures are subject to recurring oversight by regulatory or 
publicly accountable institutions. 
• The issuing source visually identified the applicant and performed 
further checks to confirm the existence of that person. 
• The issuing process for the evidence ensured that it was delivered into 
the possession of the person to whom it relates. 
• The evidence contains at least one reference number that uniquely 
identifies the person to whom it relates. 
• The full name on the evidence must be the name that the person was 
officially known by at the time of issuance. Not permitted are 
pseudonyms, aliases, an initial for surname, or initials for all given 
names. 
• The evidence contains a photograph of the person to whom it relates. 
• The evidence contains a biometric template (of any modality) of the 
person to whom it relates. 
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• The evidence includes digital information, the information is protected 
using approved cryptographic or proprietary methods, or both, and 
those methods ensure the integrity of the information and enable the 
authenticity of the issuing source to be confirmed. 
• The evidence includes physical security features that require 
proprietary knowledge and proprietary technologies to be able to 
reproduce it. 
• The evidence is unexpired. 
Table 1: Strengths of Identity Evidence (Grassi, et al., 2017) 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-12 (HSPD-12) mandated a common 
identification standard to be adopted governing the interoperable use of identity credentials. 
Federal Information Processing Standard 201 (FIPS201), Personal Identity Verification (PIV) 
of Federal Employees and Contractors, was developed to establish standards for identity 
credentials.  
 Certification Authority (CA) 
A certification authority (CA) is an entity that certifies an identity with a public key. 
Basically, the CA is the method of generating the digital identity through providing a 
certificate. Certification is a binding that occurs in the form of a signed data structure called a 
public-key certificate. A CA is an authority on the process of certification. The issuing CA 
digitally signs certificates ensuring integrity therefore a CA must be trusted by both the issuer 
of the certificate and the owner of the certificate (Ballad, Ballad, & Banks, 2011). A CSP 
must provide security management services for key generation and storage. 
 Validation Authority (VA) 
The Validation Authority (VA) is the authentication system within PKI. It verifies the 
validity of a digital certificate by following the requirements of the X.509 standard. A VA 
manages the certificate revocation list (CRL) issued by the CAs and provides online 
certificate status protocol (OSCP) function. Some VAs may also provide access control and 
authorization services (Ballad, Ballad, & Banks, 2011). 
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 Certificate Revocation 
A certificate may become revoked for a number of reasons. A person could change 
their name like some do upon marriage. Perhaps the CA issued an improper certificate or the 
private key has become compromised. Whatever the reason, when it is necessary to invalidate 
a certificate it must be revoked. This is usually done with a certificate revocation list (CRL). 
The VA would check the CRL as part of its process before authenticating. The issue with the 
current system is that the CRL is generated and published periodically potentially allowing an 
invalid certificate to be authorized when it should not (Adams & Lloyd, 2003). 
 PKI Architecture Overview 
The authentication and authorization validation process of MFA requires strong trust 
that must have meaning and be quantifiable. Since trust is more of a social construct, giving it 
meaning and finding measurements within an electronic system proves challenging. PKI’s 
reliability on the correct usage of a public/private key pairs depends upon there being a chain 
of trust among certificate authorities (CA). A public key certificate is issued as the public 
component of these key pairs and are often associated with common access cards (CACs). 
These CA’s are the third-party servers providing the certification path to authentication. Path 
validation and path construction are essential to the proper management of trust within PKI 
(Rahoof, 2017).  
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Before allowing a user access to a system or network, the authenticity of the public 
key presented must be assured. A validation authority (VA) is a trusted server providing a 
means of verifying the validity of a digital certificate. The trusting entity sends a certificate to 
the VA server that validates the public key certificate (PKC). This process typically occurs on 
the client side and requires the use of software that can support the protocols and algorithms. 
An organization’s use of a VA   in addition to establishing policies provide confidence in who 
is and who is not allowed on their systems (Ma, 2011). 
Figure 1: Service Authentication 
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Figure 2: Validation Authority Schematic Diagram 
Path construction is the process of building a CA certification path. Constructing this 
path is generally more difficult than path validation (Rahoof, 2017). These paths are defined 
and based upon the X.509 PKI standard [8]; further details can be gleamed from examination 
of that standard. Path construction typically begins with a root CA that generates its own self- 
signed certificate. Once the root CA is established it binds the identity and public key of an 
intermediate CA. The intermediate CA launches the next CA in the path and so on and so on 
until the path reaches the end-user who seeks a certificate (Ma, 2011). 
2.8 Blockchain 
In as much as email ushered in a new way of sending letters to businesses and people, 
blockchain has provided a new way of storing transactions and other kinds of data (a 
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database). Databases have been used to centrally store data for decades. Blockchain provides 
a decentralized method of storing data. Data is entered into a block and then added to a chain 
of blocks. This structure forms a blockchain. Each block in the chain is represented by a 
cryptographic hash that contains its own hash as well as the hash for the previous block 
(Gates, 2017). Blockchain is defined as “a peer-to-peer, distributed ledger that is 
cryptographically-secure, append-only, immutable, and updatable only via consensus or 
agreement among peers” (Bashir, 2018). The foundation of the blockchain began with a paper 
published by Stefan Konst in 2000 that provided instructions for implementing 
cryptographically secured chains. Blockchain offers several key benefits such as transparency, 
trust, cost reduction, transaction improvements, and security (Gates, 2017).  
Blockchain became popular due to the fact that it was the technology behind Bitcoin. 
Bitcoins are a type of electronic cash used as a digital currency on the internet. Bitcoin spelled 
with an uppercase ‘B’ references the cryptocurrency payment network, protocols, and 
blockchain. When spelled with a lowercase ‘b’, bitcoin refers to the units of bitcoin. For 
example, Sally is sending Bob 1.5 bitcoins (Ethereum, Bitcoin, Blockchain, and 
Cryptocurrencies Resources, 2018). In order to explain how blockchains function bitcoins will 
be used. 
 Creating a blockchain 
A block is an assortment of transactions which are arranged logically. A transaction is 
the transference of digital currency from a sender’s account to a receiver’s account. A block 
can consist of more than one transaction (Bashir, 2018). Block 0, or the genesis block, is the 
first block on the blockchain. The genesis block within Bitcoin was hardcoded at the time of 
creation with the message “The Times 03/Jan/2009 Chancellor on brink of second bailout for 
banks.” Each block contains a hash of the previous block’s message hash linking each block 
together in a chain and providing additional security that the previous block’s transaction has 
not been tampered with. The Bitcoin blockchain uses the SHA-256 algorithm as it’s hash. The 
SHA-256 algorithm generates a unique, fixed-size 256-bit hash (Gates, 2017).  
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Figure 3: The Generic Structure of a blockchain 
 Centralization vs Decentralization vs Distributed 
Centralization is the concentration of control of an action or process under a single 
authority. Basically, this means that a data transaction must be verified by a trusted third 
party. For example, when shopper uses a credit card for a purchase, the store is trusting 
payment for the goods provided in another party other than the shopper. This centralization of 
credit gives financial institutions prominent authority because these institutions as trusted 
third parties become the final decision makers on a shopper’s creditworthiness. It is extremely 
challenging to correct inaccuracies of information stored in a centralized database (D. Richard 
Kuhn, 2001).  
Decentralization is a fundamental aspect of blockchain technology. The trusted third 
party relied upon in a centralized system such as PKI is unnecessary. Instead, blockchain 
utilizes a consensus mechanism to validate transactions (Bashir, 2018). Every participant in 
the system makes its own decisions. Due to the viewability and validation by anyone, 
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blockchain provides transparency and trust. It allows a system of trust between parties without 
requiring an intermediary. Negotiations can be performed between individuals for practically 
anything; property, money, digital files, etc. (Gates, 2017). The responsibility and control of 
the correctness of the data stored in a blockchain-based system falls upon the individuals 
involved in the transactions. This means the network must agree and decide. Within Bitcoin, 
changes must be agreed to by a certain majority of the network. This may be 50% but could 
be as high as 70 to 80% of the network. There is a risk of a 51% attack on a blockchain 
network if a malicious user(s) controls more than 50% of the computers on the network. 
There is potential for collaboration among users on a blockchain network to influence current 
or future development through a 51% attack (Bashir, 2018). 
A distributed system is where all of the parties work together as a single coherent 
system. It has qualities of centralization and decentralization. There is still a central authority 
that has some control over the other parties in governing processes yet the other parties can 
make many of their own decisions and work autonomously. Distribution improves 
availability, reliability, fault tolerance, performance, and scalability (Bashir, 2018).  
 
 
Figure 4: Graphical Representation of Centralized, Decentralized, and Distributed 
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 Public Blockchains 
A public blockchain is available to anyone who wants to participate in the blockchain. 
There is no one exclusive power over the blockchain. Everything is open to all of those using 
the blockchain (White, 2018). 
 Private Blockchains 
A private blockchain has an organization or consortium who controls the permission 
to write data onto the blockchain. There are a set of rules that govern the blockchain. 
Transactions are not allowed if they violate the rules and regulations (White, 2018). 
 Permissioned Blockchains 
A permissioned blockchain only allows those authorized to have a role within the 
blockchain. They are the middle ground between public and private blockchains. The 
verification is performed by predetermined nodes. They use cryptography to give permissions 
to those using the blockchain (White, 2018).  
2.9 Blockchain-based PKI 
The PKI framework as it currently exists has vulnerabilities. Reporting unauthorized 
certificates is a time consuming and labor-intensive effort that leaves a CA open to a man-in-
the-middle (MITM) attack. If the CA’s are not operating correctly, the introduction of 
encryption has no value. Blockchain-based PKI techniques provides methods to secure the 
CA vulnerabilities immediately in real time (Matsumoto S. &., 2017). Blockchain is a data 
structure that utilizes public-key cryptography in the creation of tamper-proof digital 
signatures that may be shared among parties. Basically, they are online ledgers that provide 
decentralized and transparent data sharing (Kshetri). Blockchains are the technology behind 
bitcoins that have been successfully used in E-commerce. Blockchains rely on cryptographic 
proof instead of trust negating the use of a trusted third-party and allowing anonymity in 
online transactions (Yakubov).  
In order to affectively implement blockchain within two-factor authentication, 
establishing trust would be necessary to instantiate security measures against interference, 
breach, and eavesdropping (Robey, 2017). A considerable vulnerability to PKI applications 
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and platforms is their dependence on a centralized cloud. The PKI in its current form is 
centralized relying on trusted third-parties. Decentralizing and incorporating blockchains 
provides the means of overcoming several of the problems linked with the centralized cloud 
approach. Provenance and other startups are using blockchain to promote trust in product 
transactions from source to the customer (Kshetri). Blockchains can cryptographically sign 
transactions and verify the originator’s cryptographic signature to guarantee a message’s 
origin (Kshetri). Blockchains also provide secure traceability of certifications and other 
relevant data in supply chains. Blockchain’s public availability ensures transactions can be 
linked to identify vulnerable mobile devices (Robey, 2017). Suitable for registering time, 
location, price, parties, and data as they move through the supply chain, blockchain based 
MFA systems will help strengthen mobile device security (Kshetri).   
 
Figure 5: PKI Trust Structure Path Construction 
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2.10 RFID 
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology is a low powered system that 
transmits wirelessly. The tags are generally passive devices meaning they have no power 
source while the readers are a more complicated computing device with sufficient power, 
memory, communication interfaces, and its own clock. RFID began as a way to replace 
barcodes but blossomed to include a wide variety of applications such as toll transponders, 
passports, credit cards, access badges, pet tracking devices, pharmaceuticals, clothes, library 
books, and much more (Gritzalis). This has led to RFID becoming the preferred method of 
providing wireless communication between IoT devices. This has increased the need to 
commission a secure method of authentication that involves MFA. Electronic Product Code 
Class 1 Generation 2 (EPC C1 G2) standard is the most widespread RFID standard projected 
to provide secure authentication for RFID users (Kshetri).  
Lightweight authentication protocols incorporating simple cryptographic functions 
have been developed to provide an authentication method (Ma, 2011). RFID systems 
incorporate RFID tags and RFID readers. To utilize a PKI MFA, each tag needs its own 
public/private key pair with a public key certificate. The primary purpose of RFID tags is to 
allow identification by readers. A reader that has become the possession of a malicious user 
(i.e. stolen, lost, compromised) can be used to identify and track tags. Therefore, it is more 
critical to have trust in the reader than the tag (Gritzalis). One possible way of providing trust 
despite the risks associated with the reader is via near field communication. 
2.11 NFC 
Near field communication (NFC) is a more simplistic implementation of the RFID 
technology. NFC involves two wireless devices operating via short range frequencies within 
5-10 cm. There are two modes: active and passive. An active mode device starts the 
communication. These devices are referred to as the initiator. The initiator generates its own 
power and sends information by amplitude shift keying. Within passive mode the device is 
referred to as the target and uses the radio frequency (RF) field from the initiator as power for 
its communication (Matsumoto S. R.). Within NFC, the lines between reader and tag are 
blurred eliminating the primary issues of RFID PKI usage. For example, NFC-enabled 
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smartphones can switch between being a reader and being a tag. While sending the 
smartphone acts as the tag and while receiving it acts as the reader. 
 Gemalto 
Gemalto has been making contact smart cards for the DoD and other agencies for 
years. Gemalto uses the java card for their smart cards. Java card is an industry standard 
technology platform developed by Sun Microsystems (now Oracle) to enable Java-based 
applications that run on smart cards. These Java-based applications are called applets. Java 
card helps developers build, test and deploy smart card-based applications quickly and 
efficiently with an object-oriented programming model and off the shelf development tools. 
Since Java Card 3.0, the card has been extended to support a Web application model with 
servlets running on the card, and TCP/IP as basic protocol. The Virtual machine and Runtime 
Environment have been upgraded as well to support multithreading and hierarchical class 
loaders. The Java Card platform can run on contact and contactless devices since it runs on 
secure elements that power the Card Emulation mode in NFC. The java card operating system 
they use is called JLEP. This information was obtained from email and phone conversations 
with Gemalto employees. It was challenging to get more information. Gemalto clammed up 
when it was discovered I was a dissertation student with no budget to buy anything from 
them. They ghosted my emails and phones calls after revealing my student status. 
 NXP Semiconductors 
NXP Semiconductors makes a smart card using Java Card Open Platform (JCOP) 
operating system. The JCOP operating system has a Java Card Virtual Machine (JCVM) and 
lots of information can be found on it compared to JLEP. NXP’s smart cards are more popular 
in Europe than the United States. The most popular smart card using NXP’s JCOP is MiFare 
(NXP, 2019).  
 Google Titan 
Using special firmware created by Google, Titan is a security key that provides a 2FA 
solution for logging into accounts on desktop and mobile devices. They have a variety of keys 
built on FIDO open standards so they can be used with many apps and services. Titan has the 
ability to operate via NFC, USB, and Bluetooth (Google, 2019). 
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 Yubico 
Yubico has incorporated NFC into their YubiKey and given it smartcard capabilities. 
They perform RSA or ECC signing and decryption via the private key stored on the Yubikey 
following PKCS#11 standards. They come in a variety of styles and work with both Android 
and Apple smartphones.  
 
Figure 6: Yubico’s YubiKey with NFC 
Just tap the YubiKey to the back of a NFC enabled smartphone and the phone acts as 
the PIV smartcard reader. The Yubikey is being used for authentication for mobile devices, 
apps, and websites. This provides better security than a one-time passcode and is much more 
convenient as well. 
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Figure 7: YubiKey Touch and Go Capabilities with Mobile App 
 PKI utilizing NFC 
 A cryptographic challenge response protocol based on PKC and PKI has been 
developed for protecting NFC tags from attacks. This proposed framework consists of using 
symmetric cryptography (Matsumoto S. &., 2017). 
To enhance security, a secure protocol is presented with the NFC chip. The intent is to 
add an extra layer of security within NFC-enabled systems by incorporating a 
data/information processing unit. The security protocol includes a processing stack. This stack 
consists of handshaking, scheme, certificate verification, signature verification, and an alert 
mechanism. 
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Figure 8: A typical NFC architecture 
The process begins by the handshaking scheme asking for a certificate. If the 
certificate and the signature match, data is stored for further processing. If at any time there is 
an error i.e. the certificate and the signature cannot be verified, the data is discarded from the 
system and alert messages are transmitted. 
 
Figure 9: The proposed NFC system 
The proposed NFC system was tested and found to adequately protect against tag 
manipulation and data insertion. There are minor increases to the processing time the larger 
the signature size used. Thus, to save processing time use a smaller signature (Matsumoto S. 
&., 2017). Robust authentication is a requirement for MFA. Most leading services provide 
strong authentication through symmetric cryptography such as Advanced Encryption Standard 
(AES) or asymmetric cryptography such as Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). Asymmetric 
solutions such as ECC are complex to implement and often inefficient. Researchers have 
Identity, Credential, and Access Management Framework 31 
 
discovered a secure NFC with a flexible architecture call Cryptographic Protected Tags 
(CRYPTA). The latter works passively using a low-area design that utilizes as few resources 
as possible. This passive implementation provides a secure NFC/RFID that may be used in 
NFC-enabled smart phones (Plos). Authenticity and confidentiality are used to provide end-
to-end communication between a client and a server; therefore, a server is required to 
authenticate its identity to a client and vice-versa (Matsumoto S. R.). The CRYPTA tag 
provides strength in authentication through an analog antenna that demodulates and modulates 
the data, extracts the power supply, and provides a stable clock and reset signal (Plos). The 
framing logic is the portion that handles the time critical low-level commands. The 
cryptographic operations are processed within the crypto unit and is accessed by the 
microcontroller via micro-code patterns. The tag’s power is supplied from the RF field and 
provides the interface for the data, clock, and reset. Smart cards often use 32-b controllers that 
have high area and power consumption, CRYPTA uses an 8-b microcontroller with a low chip 
area and low power consumption making CRPTA more efficient than anything currently in 
use (Plos). The only downside to CRYPTA is that it is a proposed real-world RFID system 
that includes all hardware components needed for a practical chip fabrication. While the 
scientists who designed the system invented a prototype that tested well in the lab (Plos), 
more testing will be needed to prove the viability of it as an IoT solution. 
2.12 Zero Trust Architecture 
A Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) provides no implicit trust to a system based on their 
physical or network location. Access to data resources is only allowed when the resource is 
required, and authentication to both users and devices is performed before the connection is 
established. The ZTA is a response to enterprise network trends that include remote users and 
cloud-based assets that are not located within an enterprise-owned network boundary. The 
ZTA focuses on protecting resources, not network sectors, as network location is no longer 
seen as the prime component to the security stance of the resource.  
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CHAPTER 3 
3 SYSTEM DESIGN  
This chapter provides a formal characterization of the Identity, Credential, and Access 
Management (ICAM) Framework, describes each component of the framework and the 
detailed steps in its construction. A framework for identity cannot be formed without a solid 
understanding of identity within IoT. NIST Special Publication 800-63-3 Digital Identity 
Guidelines were followed. NIST Publications were followed and attributed as necessary in 
describing the framework. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, industry and government want to 
know who is on their networks and what they are doing while on them. The PKI systems that 
worked so well in the 20th century do not meet the mobile demands of the 21st century. In 
today’s dynamic world, PKI must become decentralized and identity must be digitized in such 
a manner that an individual feel assured they have control over their personal data. As identity 
and security were an afterthought of the internet, safely maneuvering cyberspace relies on 
frameworks that will provide the needed infrastructure to protect individuals, industries, and 
government’s data. The ICAM Framework although theoretical provides updates to PKI that 
establishes a digital identity for our mobile world that no other framework has given. 
3.1 RESEARCH APPROACH 
This study utilized the design science research (DSR) method to develop the ICAM 
theoretical framework.  The DSR method is a creative research paradigm that concentrates on 
the development and performance of artifacts with the explicit intention of improving the 
functional performance of the artifact. Compared to other research methodologies, DSR is 
more pragmatic and is a quest for understanding and improvement.  The DSR method uses 
design as a research method or technique targeting the improvement or innovation of 
information and communication technology (ICT) artifacts (Vaishnavi & Keuchler, Jr, 2015).  
Design science research is the design and investigation of artifacts that are goal-
oriented. The technical research goal defines the problems and designs an artifact so that it 
contributes to solving these problems. The engineering cycle is the design problem solving 
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process that consists of tasks: problem investigation, treatment design, treatment validation, 
treatment implementation, and implementation evaluation. (Wieringa, 2014).  
 
 
Figure 10: DSR Engineering Cycle (Wieringa, 2014) 
Due to the problem-solving or performance improving aspects of DSR, it is sometimes 
called improvement research. Emphasis is placed on contributing to the body of knowledge 
surrounding the problem set with the goal of providing potential solutions to the areas of 
greatest concern (Vaishnavi & Keuchler, Jr, 2015). Therefore, this research is focused on the 
development of an artifact that facilitates solutions of critical interest within the research 
community or society or both in regards to having a trusted digital identity that will work in 
our mobile world.  
 Treatment 
The DSR method sidesteps calling an artifact a solution in order to prevent 
impartiality to an artifacts result. Instead artifacts are considered treatments. Treatment 
suggests that the artifact is interacting with a problem and allows the researcher to gage the 
effectiveness is “treating” the problem. Treatments are designed and documented in a 
specification. A design is a decision about what to do and a specification is a documentation 
of that decision (Wieringa, 2014). 
 Implementation 
An implementation can mean different things to different people depending upon 
context. For the purposes of this research, an implementation takes the standard DSR 
definition and defines implementation as the application of the treatment to the original 
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problem set. Implementation begins to appear after the first few iterations of the engineering 
cycle. The treatment is designed then evaluated returning to the design phase as often as 
necessary until the evaluation and validation phases show satisfactory results (Wieringa, 
2014). 
 
 Validation and Evaluation 
Treatment validation requires that it contribute to the technical research goals if 
implemented. As shown in Figure 6: DSR Engineering Cycle (Wieringa, 2014) validation 
comes before implementation and involves a thorough examination of the effects of the 
treatment upon the problem set. Based on the validation process a design theory is developed 
which envisions the outcome if the treatment were implemented (Wieringa, 2014). 
Evaluation is a constant progression throughout the engineering cycle that consist of 
multiple micro-evaluations at every design aspect choice. Evaluation is performed after 
implementation. Implementation within DSR does not consist of using it in the real world. 
The goal of evaluation is to investigate how effective a treatment is through simulation, 
modeling, or theorizing (Vaishnavi & Keuchler, Jr, 2015). The ICAM framework was created 
through theorizing from simulations to create an artifact that can used for future work. 
3.2 LIMITATIONS 
The ICAM Framework will decentralize the existing centralized PKI system. Within 
the context of this research, the validation and evaluation of the decentralization occurred in 
limited locations. The framework is theoretically designed to successfully function in an 
unlimited number of sites. Due to the robust nature and substantiation of decentralization 
within blockchain technology in real world implementations, the limitation in number should 
not be a problem. Consideration to validating and evaluating the framework in larger numbers 
is mentioned in future work.  
3.3 THE ICAM COMPONENTS 
The ICAM system can be broken down into three major components: the frontend 
subsystem, the issuance and management subsystem, and the access control subsystem. The 
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frontend contains the PIV card, the card reader, and the PIN input device. The Issuance and 
management subsystem comprise the components responsible for the identity proofing and 
registrations, the card and key issuance and management, and PKI directory and certificate 
status servers. The access control subsystem consists of the logical and physical access 
control systems, the protected data, and the authorization data. 
 
 
3.4 ISSUANCE AND MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM 
The issuance and management subsystem can be broken down into two major 
components; identity management and credential management. Identity management allows 
Figure 11: ICAM PIV System Overview 
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an organization to establish, maintain, and terminate identities. Credential management allows 
an organization to issue, track, update, and revoke digital credentials for identities.  
 Identity Management 
The foundation of any system managing identity is trust in the authenticity of that 
identity. In the United States (U.S.), when a citizen is born, the parents provide the hospital 
with a name. The hospital issues a notarized birth certificate with the person’s name, date of 
birth, and U.S. citizenship. That person now has an identity for life. Any time the person 
wants to prove who they are, they simply provide their birth certificate. With a birth 
certificate, a U.S. citizen can obtain a U.S. passport as it is unlawful to enter or exit the United 
States without one. The U.S. citizen also resides in a state or U.S. territory that will issue a 
state identification (ID) that most citizens obtain in the form of a driver’s license. Citizens, 
government agencies, and industry trust birth certificates, passports, and driver’s licenses as 
identification for an individual. Since digital identities require the same level of trust, 
identities within ICAM begin with a credential service provider that vets the person’s identity 
through the showing of a birth certificate, passport, or driver’s license/ state ID.  
3.4.1.1 Identity Proofing 
Identity proofing is the process by which an identity is first established. This process 
can be simple or complicated depending on the IAL that is required of the identity. The ICAM 
Framework strongly encourages IAL 3 for proofing the identity of the person or object. This 
means the digital identity is verified and validated by an authorized and trained credential 
service provider by the physical presence of the real person or thing. 
3.4.1.2 Creation 
Establishing a digital identity record within the system composed of attributes that 
define a person or entity. Each identity must be associated with an identifier. An identifier is a 
unique attribute that can be used to locate a specific identity. For example, a state may have 
more than one Susan Jones but the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) provides each with 
a different driver’s license number. 
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3.4.1.3 Maintenance 
Once a record of the identity is stored within the system it must be maintained. 
Identity lifecycle management needs to occur ensuring accurate and current attributes within 
an identity record over its life cycle. For example, current home address and phone number is 
in the system if the person moves, etc. 
3.4.1.4 Identity Resolution 
If for whatever reason, there is more than one identity record for the same person or 
entity, the identity must be reconciled. There must be only one identifier per person or entity 
for the system to maintain its credibility and trustability. Extreme care must be taken to ensure 
that no loopholes exist in the identity proofing to allow a malicious user that ability to create a 
second or third identity record. 
3.4.1.5 Deactivation 
Identity record deactivation is critical for similar reasons as identity resolution. When 
a person or entity should no longer have access to the infrastructure for whatever reason, their 
identity record must be deactivated immediately. This maintains confidence and assurance 
that an identity can be trusted. 
 Credential Management 
Just like there must be a trusted agency and system to manage identities, there must be 
a trusted agency and system to manage credentials, a CSP. The CSP will issue, track, update, 
and revoke credentials for an entity within an organization. Following HSPD-12, the PIV 
credential is the one ICAM Framework uses as digital proof of an entity’s identity. The CSP 
will function at IAL3. With the ICAM Framework following the criteria for superior identity 
evidence, individuals, government, and industry can be assured that an identity is authentic 
and has not been forged. They can feel confident that any information they have been 
provided is correct and pertains to the real-life object. When a CSP is IAL3 and meets 
superior strength for identity evidence the goal of establishing a connection between a 
claimed identity and a real-life object is confirmed through following the highest levels of 
identity verification. There are 5 phases of credential management, sponsorship, registration, 
issuance, maintenance, and revocation. 
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3.4.2.1 Sponsorship 
Before an entity is provided a digital certificate that allows access to a network or 
system, the entity must be sponsored. Via an authorized role through a registered entity 
following the principle of least privilege, an entity is granted permission for admittance to 
only the devices or applications in which there is a strong validated reason to access. This 
authorization should be granted via documentation that is stored at registration in case the 
need should ever arise to confirm or investigate the reasons access was granted. The 
authorization will include the identity of the entity, the systems, devices, and application the 
entity is allowed to access, and the duration this permission is allowed. Every sponsorship is 
allowed a maximum of two years. This is to ensure a continuous monitoring of all entities 
permissions in order to evaluate the risks to internal assets and business functions in order to 
provide better security. 
3.4.2.2 Registration 
A typical registration would consist of the entities name, address, sponsorship, and 
identity validation. If the entity is a non-person such as a system, application, or mobile 
device then the address would consist of the entities mac address instead of a physical 
address. The identity of the entities must be confirmed through an organization following the 
identity management of the ICAM Framework. The sponsorship is a first check on a valid 
entity but the entities identity should be confirmed again at registration as a defense in depth 
process to ensure the truth of identities allowed to register. 
3.4.2.3 Issuance aka the Certification Authority (CA) 
Issuance of a digital identity is done through the CA. Once identity has been 
confirmed real and has sponsorship, a digital identity is issued on a PIV card. The PIV card is 
a contact/contactless java card that follows the FIPS201 standards. This digital identity is a 
signed certificate. The CA will issue a signed certificate following the X.509 standard that 
certifies an entity’s ownership of a public key. This public key will be added to the 
blockchain. The private key remains in the entity’s possession securely stored on the PIV 
card. 
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The ICAM PIV X.509 Certificate structure follows NIST and X.509 standards because 
it works therefore no point in reinventing the wheel. The only difference is the addition of the 
Blockchain name and blockchain public key. 
 
 
 
Version 
Serial number 
Algorithm ID 
Issuer 
Validity 
--Not Before Date 
-- Not After Date 
Subject 
Subject Public Key Info 
Public Key Algorithm 
Subject Public Key 
Issuer Unique Identifier 
Subject Unique Identifier 
Extensions 
Blockchain Unique Identifier 
Blockchain Public Key 
Certificate Signature Algorithm 
Certificate Signature 
 
Table 2: Structure of ICAM PIV X.509 Certificate 
An example of an ICAM X.509 certificate: 
Data: 
Version: 3 (0x2) 
Serial Number: 1 (0x1) 
    Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption 
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Issuer: C=BE, ST=East Flanders, L=Ghent, O=KU Leuven - Campus Ghent, 
   O=Computer Science Department, OU=MSEC, CN=MSEC Tutorial Client CA 
Validity 
Not Before: May 12 13:38:13 2014 GMT 
Not After : May 12 13:38:13 2015 GMT 
Subject: C=BE, ST=East Flanders, L=Ghent, O=KU Leuven - Campus Ghent, 
    O=Computer Science Department, OU=MSEC, CN=Alice in Wonderland 
    /emailAddress=alice@msec.be 
Subject Public Key Info: 
     Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption 
Public-Key: (2048 bit) 
Modulus: 
00:be:2e:3d:32:72:4a:92:ff:67:7b:df:7c:89:83: 
... 
72:91 
Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) 
X509v3 extensions: 
X509v3 Basic Constraints: 
CA:FALSE 
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: 
5D:1D:32:41:95:72:C6:CA:9C:E6:91:4B:32:50:C7:6E:14:68:F9:CA 
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: 
keyid:8B:D5:5E:F2:84:62:04:E4:91:25:78:74:87:14:5F:F2:F0:20:AC:2E 
DirName:/CN=MSEC Tutorial Root CA/OU=MSEC/O=KU Leuven - Campus Ghent/ 
O=Computer Science Department/L=Ghent/ST=East Flanders/C=BE 
serial:02 
X509v3 Key Usage: 
Digital Signature, Non-Repudiation, Key Encipherment 
X509v3 Extended Key Usage: 
TLS Web Client Authentication 
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption 
3e:be:89:73:ed:92:ff:f2:89:2b:98:0a:46:e8:26:b7:af:53: 
... 
a7:4a:ec:89 
 
There are three certificates on the PIV card; encryption certificate, signature 
certificate, and PIV-auth certificate. The PIV-Auth will be used for authentication, Signature 
will be used for email and document signing, and encryption will be used for encryption 
(obviously). 
Identity Management Framework PIV Card Certificate Configuration
PIV Authentication Signature Encryption
 
Table 3: ICAM PIV Card Certificate Configuration 
3.4.2.3.1 Blockchain 
The CA issuing the certificates is also responsible for the blockchain. Since trust in the 
identity is the primary aim of the ICAM Framework, a private blockchain is instantiated. Only 
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vetted agencies such as the CAs through the CSPs may make changes to the blockchain. A 
vetted agency is one that can be trusted by confirmation through a certificate issued to them 
from the root CA.  
Root CA
Centralized
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
 
Figure 12: The root certificate authority is centralized 
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Figure 13: All other CA’s are distributed 
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There are two blockchains, an active blockchain and a revoked blockchain. The active 
blockchain contains the list of entities, their access privileges, and their public keys that are 
allowed onto the network/system. The revoked blockchain contains a list of entities and their 
certificates public keys that are no longer allowed onto the network/system. Every ten minutes 
if a change to the directory has occurred, the CA adds a new block and chains it to the 
previous block. This heavily encrypted new block contains a ledger of all of the public keys of 
authorized entities and their permissions. This block is signed with the CAs private key. Since 
the blockchain is private and the CA is a trusted entity within the system, no mining is 
necessary. The new block is sent across the network to allow all nodes to sync. 
3.4.2.4 Maintenance 
Maintaining the blockchains of digital certificates is the most critical area to ensure 
success of the ICAM framework. Certificates expire, get revoked, or people lose them. All of 
this requires care and attention to the process. Maintenance is comprised of 5 key subsets: 
renewal, reset, suspension, blocking, and reissuance. Naturally, the blockchain kept as is with 
new blocks added every ten minutes would grow larger than the system could efficiently 
handle. Therefore, the root CA will monitor system productivity and make structural changes 
to the blockchains as needed. As there is only one root CA this maintains the integrity of the 
blockchains and system efficiency.  
3.4.2.4.1 Renewal 
When a certificate expires the entity must go through the same process that they did 
initially in order to obtain new credentials. In order for the entity not to lose access to the 
systems and services they need, the renewal process should be started before the certificate 
expires. All expired certificates will be kept linked to the entity for accurately identifying the 
entities history. Since history is not a primary feature of the system, records of old certificates 
will be kept in a traditional database that can be accessed as needed by the system. Renewing 
a certificate must insure no duplicate digital identities therefore the reset step follows renewal. 
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3.4.2.4.2 Reset 
The reset process is similar to identity resolution in the Identity Management system. 
There must be only one active certificate per entity for the system to maintain its credibility 
and trustability. The reset process consists of changing the old certificate to the new certificate 
throughout the system. A thorough check and recheck will be performed to ensure the system 
functions with the new certificate being the only certificate tied to the entity. 
3.4.2.4.3 Suspension 
There are times when an entities certificates will need to be suspended. This means 
that the entity cannot continue to use the certificate for a period of time. The suspension time 
period must be specified with a start and end date. If the suspension is not resumed before the 
end date, the certificate is revoked.  
3.4.2.4.4 Blocking 
The ICAM Framework is intended to provide trust in the identity of entities using a 
system. Since no system is perfect, instances may occur when a digital credential must be 
blocked. This means that the entity may not access some or all of the network, applications, 
and systems. An update to the blockchain occurs instantly. There is no waiting the usual 10 
minutes to ensure the strictest security possible to the system. 
3.4.2.4.5 Reissuance 
Reissuance is very similar to renewal but occurs before the expiration of an existing 
certificate. This could occur if the entity’s PIV Card is lost or stolen. If the PIV has been 
stolen, reissuance and blocking should occur. Reissuance follows all steps from the renewal 
process. 
3.4.2.5 Revocation 
If an entity loses their privileges to the system, their certificates can no longer be used. 
The reason for the revocation is documented and digitally signed by an authorized entity. The 
revoked blockchain is updated.  
3.5 ACCESS CONTROL SUBSYSTEM 
The access control subsystem provides access management which allows only those 
entities permitted the ability to perform an action on a particular resource. The access control 
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subsystem is where the verification authority (VA) is housed. The three most common access 
management services are policy administration, authentication, and authorization.  
 Verification Authority (VA) 
Before access is granted to any system the VA is the system that will confirm the 
validity of the certificates by checking against the active blockchain and the revoked 
blockchain. The VA is a node on the network of those receiving the blockchains. It makes no 
changes to the blockchains. It only reads them. All this system does is compare the certificates 
from an incoming request to the blockchains. Having the blockchains sent to the VA as part of 
the blockchain peer-to-peer network reduces the amount of network traffic required for 
certificate validation. The lists are there at the system where access is being requested. 
 Policy Administration 
The ICAM Framework does not establish specific policy administration. This is left up 
to the system owners who are using the ICAM Framework as only they know the laws, 
regulations, rules, and organizational access policies to put into effect for their system. Policy 
administration is mentioned within the ICAM Framework to ensure that access policies are 
established for the system. The rules and regulations for organizational access policies should 
be clearly defined and documented. Credential management will follow policy administration 
guidelines. 
 Authentication 
The VA will check that the credential presented via a PIV card was issued by a trusted 
organization, the credential’s expiration date, and if the credential is on the revoked 
blockchain. When the entities identity is confirmed through the VA using its credential to be 
valid, the entity will confirm that the credential belongs to them by entering their PIN. When 
both the certificate and PIN are confirmed (two-factor authentication), the entities identity is 
considered authenticated. 
 Authorization 
Just because an entity has been confirmed authentic does not mean that entity has 
access to the system. Once authenticated, the entities authorizations listed on the active 
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blockchain are checked. If the system the entity requested access to is on the list, 
authorization is granted. If the system is not on the list, the entity is denied authorization. 
 Access Management 
Policy administration determines the rule sets that govern access to resources. The 
linking and unlinking of access permissions for the entity to a resource must be followed. For 
example, policy sets the length of time before the entity needs to reauthenticate themselves. 
This could be a prompting to reenter the PIN assuring the entity is the genuine. Or locking the 
entity out of the resource and reinitiating the request for access. 
3.6 FRONTEND SUBSYSTEM 
The frontend subsystem consists of the PIV card, the PIV reader, and the PIN input 
device. The user will present their PIV card to the PIV reader and be prompted by the PIN 
input device to enter their PIN. The PIV reader and the PIN input device communicates with 
the access control subsystem to establish authentication and authorization. 
 PIV Card 
The PIV card will be a contact/contactless Java Card that follows NIST Special 
Publication 800-73. The PIV card will contain a cardholder unique identifier (CHUID) that is 
digitally signed by the authorizing CA and the card authentication. The card authentication is 
a certificate containing the key pair that is used to verify that the PIV credential was issued by 
an authorized entity, has not expired, and has not been revoked. 
The following two electronic elements authenticate the identity of the PIV card owner. 
The PIV card will contain a photograph that is digitally signed allowing confirmation that the 
printed photo on the card has not been altered and PIV authentication. The PIV authentication 
is a certificate and key pair that is used to verify that the PIV credential was issued by an 
authorized entity, has not expired, has not been revoked, and the holder of the credential is the 
same individual it was issued to. 
The following electronic elements are for usage by the PIV card holder. A digital 
signature which is a certificate and key pair that allows the PIV card owner to digitally sign a 
document or email, providing both integrity and non-repudiation. Encryption which is a 
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certificate and key pair allowing the PIV card owner to digitally encrypt documents or email 
thus providing confidentiality through ensuring only authorized parties can read the document 
or email. 
The PIV card contact and contactless portions will mimic each other by each 
containing all of the information listed above. The contact (chip) portion of the Java Card is to 
allow functionality with existing PKI readers on desktops and laptops while the contactless 
(NFC) portion of the Java Card provides the means to expand PKI to mobile devices. 
 PIV Reader 
The PIV card reader is the piece of hardware that helps read the card. The card reader 
supplies power to the chip or NFC and allows the device’s operating system to talk to the PIV 
credential chip or NFC operating system. Most smart mobile devices are equipped with the 
ability to read NFC (contactless portion of the PIV card). Existing PKI systems can continue 
to operate as they always have by using their current contact PIV card readers. 
 PIN Input Device 
Middleware is the computer software or drivers that allow the computer (whether 
desktop or mobile) to interact with the PIV credentials to support authentication, digital 
signatures, encryption, and integrations with the personal identification number (PIN) device. 
On a standard desktop or laptop, the PIN input device will be a keyboard. On a mobile device, 
this could be a software tool that is part of the middleware or a separate piece of software that 
works in conjunction with the middleware. If the mobile device is a smartphone, the PIN 
input device could be the phone’s keyboard, on-screen or physical. 
3.7 Digital Identity Summary 
The next iteration of DoD PIV cards from Gemalto will contain NFC capabilities. But 
since the DoD PKI system does not have a method to handle mobile devices, the NFC portion 
within the DoD PIV cards will not be utilized until a mobile PKI system is setup. The ICAM 
Framework provides that solution. YubiKey has already demonstrated how NFC can securely 
handle PIV credentials. NFC can securely contain the necessary credentials for digital 
identity. Therefore, the ICAM will require the use of Java Cards that are contact/contactless. 
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Having dual functionality will allow existing PKI systems to continue to operate as they have 
while providing the additional capabilities of mobile devices. 
3.8 ZTA 
The new Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) reshapes traditional network defense by 
moving network defenses from wide network perimeters to narrowly focusing on individual 
or small groups of resources. The ICAM Framework ensures the user is who they say they are 
using ZTA for trusting no one. The system will believe the person is who they say they are 
only once proven.  Policy administration should ensure the tenants of ZTA are being followed 
by its governance. 
3.9 Blockchain-based Digital Credentials 
Within blockchain-based digital credentials is a certification path that leads back to the 
root CA called the chain of trust. The root CA is where the chain of trust begins. Every CA 
must be trusted within the ICAM Framework or the chain of trust becomes broken. The root 
certificate is self-signed but every other certificate issued is signed by a CA. The CA’s 
certificates are signed by the root CA. 
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 What is being decentralized (distributed)? 
What systems within PKI is being decentralized for the ICAM Framework? The root 
CA is centralized but the rest are distributed. There are many CAs that can be spread out 
among a country or the world. Each CA is a node on the peer-to-peer network. Only the CAs 
are allowed to make changes to the blockchains. The VAs are distributed as well. There are 
many VAs spread out among the resources requiring access control. The CAs and VAs do not 
have to reside together but in some instances they could.  
 
 
 
Figure 14: Chain of Trust 
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CHAPTER 4 
4 CASE STUDY (RESULTS AND DISCUSSION) 
In developing a proof of concept that would answer the research questions it was 
necessary to create two proof of concepts; a digital identity on NFC and a digital identity on 
blockchain-based PKI. This allowed the research to focus on the questions and reveal emerging 
knowledge that contributed to the ICAM framework through each iteration of the DSR 
methodology. It also allowed for the two proof of concepts to provide one artifact that becomes 
the object of study.  
The most challenging part in developing the ICAM Framework was in figuring out a 
way to allow blockchain to revoke certificates. There was research and exploration in having a 
single blockchain that would contain everything. In the end, it was found that one blockchain 
that had valid and invalid certificates is harder to implement and has the potential for a revoked 
certificate to be missed. Therefore, two separate blockchains would be better; an active 
blockchain and a revoked blockchain. All certificates will be checked to ensure they are not on 
the revoked blockchain in much the same way as the certificate revocation list (CRL) works on 
the standard PKI system. 
4.1 Digital Identities on NFC 
Yubico’s Yubikey 5 NFC was used to demonstrate this proof of concept. The Security 
Key NFC from Yubico uses NFC for tap-and-go authentication over the FIDO U2F and 
FIDO2/WebAuthn protocols on Android phones. While FIDO2 is not the same as PKI, it 
demonstrates that NFC can be used contain a digital identity for authenticating users on their 
mobile devices.  
FIDO uses public key cryptography which is issued to a user upon registration but the 
registration is self-sovereign. An individual saying who they are will not be a trusted digital 
identity. The digital identity can be linked to a single, unique identity and validated as genuine 
but the Yubikey demonstrates that public key cryptography will fit on an NFC card, can be read 
by a smartphone, and has no noticeable drain on the battery life. The Yubico FIPS series 
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demonstrates that FIPS 140-2 validation can be integrated at some point with NFC capabilities 
to provide the highest authenticator assurance level 3 per NIST SP800-63B guidance.  
 
 
Figure 15: YubiKey Touch-and-Go 
 Question Results 
Digital Identity 
• Can an identity be verified as belonging to a real person or thing supplying the 
digital identity? 
No, according to the tenets of ZTA, the digital identity using Yubico’s 
YubiKey are not a verified identity. The digital identity is self-sovereign. 
• Can a claimed identity be securely linked to a single, unique identity? 
Yes, a claimed identity can be securely linked to a single, unique identity. 
• Can the evidence supplied by an identity be validated as genuine (e.g. not 
counterfeit or spoofed)? 
No, according to the tenets of ZTA, the identity cannot be validated as 
genuine. 
• Can the digital identity be validated as existing in the real world? 
No, according to the tenets of ZTA, the identity is not validated as existing in 
the real world. 
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The iterations of testing the digital identity on a YubiKey as it exists with Google’s 
FIDO U2F brought the importance of the ZTA to the ICAM framework. Trust is the most 
critical component in ensuring success in a PKI. In order to change the above no answers to 
yes, the identity management component of the CSP was instantiated within the ICAM 
framework. 
The identity management component of the Issuance and Management Subsystem 
identity proofing phases ensures that the entity or person is real by requiring the physical 
presence and showing a valid form of identification such as a passport or driver’s license. 
Connecting to database systems like the police or TSA officers use to check against 
counterfeits provides evidence that the identity is genuine and exists in the real world. The 
additional phases of identity management ensure ZTA throughout the lifecycle of an identity. 
The CA’s as they currently operate do not have any formal oversight so are usually 
only trusted within a business or organization. In order for all CA’s to be trusted by all 
business’, governments, and individuals and to ensure no spoofing or counterfeiting of the 
certificates, all CA’s are vetted and registered to a centralized certification authority as part of 
the credential management component of the Issuance and Management Subsystem. This is 
the root certificate or root of trust that signs the certificates that the distributed CA’s are 
issued. The additional phases of the credential management component ensure trust 
throughout the certificate’s lifecycle. 
In order to provide defense in depth trust in identities, authorization to the various 
systems, subsystems, and components of the Issuance and Management Subsystem, is only 
provided if the user’s role requires it per the tenets of least privilege.  
 
NFC 
• Can the encryption size be reduced to fit on an NFC card? 
Yes, the YubiKey can use public key cryptography following FIPS AAL3 
standards according to NIST SP800-63B guidelines. 
• Can a smartphone with NFC enabled be a smart card reader? 
Yes, the smartphone could read the YubiKey every time with no problems. 
• Is there a secure communication channel between the card and device? 
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Yes, on a Samsung Android device such as the one used for testing; Samsung 
Knox provides direct control of the NFC chip embedded in the device. The 
Knox Platform provides security hardening for every aspect of mobile device 
operation. It enables trust on mobile endpoints with Samsung’s Real-Time 
Kernel Protection (RKP) that is considered one of the best kernel protection 
technologies available from any mobile device vendor (Samsung, 2019). 
• What drain is there on the battery life? 
The mobile device used for testing was a Samsung Galaxy Note 10+. On this 
device there was no noticeable drain on the battery life. The battery percentage 
was documented within an excel spreadsheet at the start and end of an hour 
period of using the YubiKey to log into various Google accounts. Some 
differences could be attributed to receiving text messages or phone calls during 
that hour time period. It seemed to remain steadily at 1% if no texts or phone 
calls came in during the hour of testing. 
 
  Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 Test 4 Test 5 Test 6 Average 
Battery 
Start 76.00% 96.00% 77.00% 72.00% 75.00% 86.00% 
1.80% Battery 
End 75.00% 94.00% 74.00% 71.00% 73.00% 85.00% 
Usuage 1.00% 2.00% 3.00% 1.00% 2.00% 1.00% 
Table 4: Battery Life 
Overall, the results showed that NFC is a viable option for updating PKI’s front-end to 
allow functionality with mobile devices. The smart cards currently in use today Java 3 are 
already capable of being both contact and contactless making it an easier transition away from 
traditional PKI front-end usage. More details on how the YubiKey was installed and tested 
can be found in Appendix A. 
4.2 Digital Identities on Blockchain-Based PKI 
Remme’s Protocol was used as the blockchain-based PKI. Only the free services of 
Remme was utilized but it was enough to demonstrate that PKI can become a distributed system 
with blockchain. REMChain is the first public blockchain to be built on top of Protocol. 
REMChain is not open-source but its success demonstrates that blockchain-based PKI can 
support millions of users, perform identity brokering, allow separate PKI systems from 
competitors to work together, and provide a trusted third-party CA. 
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 Background 
I began using some source code from GitHub on pki-blockchain (wshbair & 
alyakubov, 2019). The developers had created a Proof of Concept blockchain-based PKI 
implementation. Starting with their code would be faster than starting from scratch and why 
reinvent the wheel? In working with their code, I quickly realized that I would be very limited 
in creating a network. In conducting more research, I learned about Remme. Remme is a 
blockchain-based PKI protocol that can be used for issuing and managing public keys. 
Remme core is built on Hyperledger Sawtooth platform and allows flexibility in language 
choices during development. Remme also supports JS and .Net programming (Roman-tik, 
2019 ).  
The Remme protocol follows the X.509 standards for its public keys. The web server 
authenticates its client with the help of certificates and the associated private key. The current 
limitation is that the Remme Protocol on works on Ubuntu 18.04 (Remme, 2019).  
Digital Identity 
• Can an identity be verified as belonging to a real person or thing supplying the 
digital identity? 
No, according to the tenets of ZTA, the digital identity using Remme are not a 
verified identity. The digital identity is self-sovereign. 
• Can a claimed identity be securely linked to a single, unique identity? 
Yes, a claimed identity can be securely linked to a single, unique identity. 
• Can the evidence supplied by an identity be validated as genuine (e.g. not 
counterfeit or spoofed)? 
No, according to the tenets of ZTA, the identity cannot be validated as 
genuine. 
• Can the digital identity be validated as existing in the real world? 
No, according to the tenets of ZTA, the identity is not validated as existing in 
the real world. 
 
To turn these no answers into a yes, it was found that Remme’s public key 
cryptography was lacking similar qualities that the YubiKey does in regards to establishing a 
trusted digital identity. In addition, the very public blockchain nature of Remme led to the 
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ICAM framework being built on a private based blockchain. This ensures that only verified 
entities are allowed access and permissions to make changes to the blockchain. Again, this is 
following the tenets of ZTA. More details on how Remme was installed and tested can be 
found in Appendix B. 
Blockchain 
• Can PKI become a distributed system with blockchain? 
Yes, running Remme’s tests showed that PKI can become distributed with 
blockchain. 
• Can blockchain allow separate PKI systems to function as one? 
Yes, theoretically it should allow separate PKI systems to function as one. This 
is because Remme has been implemented within RemChain. RemChain being 
a public blockchain has demonstrated success in separate PKI systems 
functioning as one.  
• Can blockchain perform identity brokering? 
Yes, RemChain proves successful in performing identity brokering but it does 
not follow the tenets of ZTA 
• Can PKI systems from competitors be trusted? 
No, not as RemChain or Remme currently exist due to a lack of vetting in 
identities and the openness of the public blockchain 
• Can Blockchain-Based PKI provide a trusted identity for the internet? 
Yes, with changes to the type of blockchain used and processes that follow 
ZTA 
• Can blockchain provide a trusted third-party certification authority? 
Yes, again with changes to the type of blockchain and ZTA 
• Can the size of the blockchain be hosted by enough peers? 
Unsure of size limit. The blockchain testing worked well with numbers up to 
10,000 blocks. The size did not reach the numbers it might when the entire 
internet works together to form a trusted web. More testing needs to be 
performed in future work. 
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In order for the blockchain-based PKI to form a web of trust, the tenets of ZTA needed to be 
implemented within the ICAM framework. A private, permissioned blockchain was chosen in 
order to ensure trust in the entities accessing the blockchain and making modifications. Roles 
will be limited based on least privilege separation of duties. For example, a VA system would 
only be allowed to authenticate and authorize an entity based on their certifications and 
permissions granted. The VA would only be allowed to read the revoked blockchain and not 
make any changes. 
4.3 Future Work 
The next step for the theoretical ICAM framework is to find a company to be the client 
as part of Technical Action Research (TAR). The researcher plays three roles: designer, helper, 
and researcher. The researcher desires to learn something about a technique by using it to help 
a client.  Technology drives TAR not problems. In TAR, a client with an experimental artifact 
is the object of study. Therefore, a client uses the ICAM framework as the artifact and provides 
the funding to implement a real world blockchain-based PKI using NFC. 
Instead of relying on Yubikeys actual Java 3 cards programmed specifically for the 
ICAM framework need to be used. The Java 3 card provides contact and contactless capabilities 
allowing the card to continue working with existing systems while making room for updating 
the system. Rather than using Remme for the blockchain-based PKI it must be created from 
scratch or start with one such as Fluree because a distributed permission blockchain-based PKI 
system needs to be established. This is distributed because all participating parties in the ICAM 
framework system need to work together and form a cohesive system of trust among each other. 
Permissioned blockchains maintain trust by only allowing certain actions to be performed by 
participants identified as needing to perform those actions. This ensures the tenets of zero trust 
are being followed. 
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CHAPTER 5 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
“Closing the identity gap is an enormous challenge. It will take the work of many 
committed people and organizations coming together across different geographies, sectors and 
technologies. But it’s exciting to imagine a world where safe and secure digital identities are 
possible, providing everyone with an essential building blocks to every right and opportunity 
they deserve.” – Peggy Johnson Executive VP, Business Development, Microsoft Corporation 
 
Industry and government want to know who is on their networks and what they are 
doing while on them. People want to trust that the person they are talking with online is who 
they say they are and that the email is actually from the company it claims to be. The only way 
to achieve this is through trusted digital identities. The PKI systems that worked so well in the 
20th century do not meet the mobile demands of the 21st century.  
In today’s dynamic world, PKI must become distributed and identity must be digitized 
in such a manner that an individual feel assured they have control over their personal data. As 
identity and security were an afterthought of the internet, safely maneuvering cyberspace relies 
on frameworks that will provide the needed infrastructure to protect an individual’s, an 
industry’s, and government’s data. Blockchain-based PKI opens the door to a standard that 
allows everyone willing to participate to run on a federated infrastructure. This enables PKI to 
truly be a “public” system. Governments and industry following the same set of standards 
utilizing certificates signed by the same root certificate authority can all belong to the 
permission based blockchain where their CSPs are part of the distributed network. The ICAM 
Framework provides updates to PKI that establishes a digital identity for our mobile world that 
no other framework has given.  
  
Identity, Credential, and Access Management Framework 58 
 
REFERENCES 
Adams, C., & Lloyd, S. (2003). Understanding PKI Concepts, Standards, and Deployment 
Considerations. Boston, MA: Pearson Education, Inc. 
Ballad, B., Ballad, T., & Banks, E. K. (2011). Access Control, Authenticatin, and Public Key 
Infrastructure. Sudbury, MA: Jones & Bartlett Learning, LLC. 
Bashir, I. (2018). Mastering Blockchain (second edition). Birminghan, UK: Packt Publishing 
Ltd. 
Batten, L. M. (2012). Public Key Cryptography. Piscataway, NJ: Wiley. 
CardContact. (2019, December 15). OpenCard Framework. Retrieved from CardContact 
smart system architects: http://www.gemalto.com/techno/opencard/ 
Chen, Z. (2000). Java Card Technology for Smart Cards. Palo Alto, California: Sun 
Microsystems, Inc. 
Chen, Z. (2000). Java Card Technology for Smart Cards. California: Sun Microsystems, Inc. 
Chirico, U. (2014). Smart Card Programming A comprehensive guide to smart card 
programming in C/C++, Java, C#, VB.NET. Morrisville, NC: Lulu Press. 
Crowd Research Partners. (2019). Insider Threat 2018 Report. CA Technologies. 
D. Richard Kuhn, V. C.-J. (2001). Introduction to Public Key Technology and the Federal 
PKI Infrastructure. U.S. Government. 
DISA. (2018, April 20). milcloud. Retrieved from DISA: 
https://www.disa.mil/Computing/Cloud-Services/MilCloud 
DISA. (2018, April 18). Our Work/DISA 101. Retrieved from DISA: 
https://www.disa.mil/en/About/Our-Work 
ENISA. (2019). ENISA Threat Landscape Report 2018. Heraklion, Greece: ENISA. doi:DOI 
10.2824/622757 
Ethereum. (2019, March 10). Ethereum Docs. Retrieved from Ethereum Homestead: 
http://www.ethdocs.org/en/latest/ 
Ethereum Foundation. (2019, March 10). Ethereum. Retrieved from Ethereum: 
https://www.ethereum.org/ 
Identity, Credential, and Access Management Framework 59 
 
Ethereum, Bitcoin, Blockchain, and Cryptocurrencies Resources. (2018). Wise Fox 
Publishing. 
Evered, G. I. (1978, Dec). An Assessment of the Scientific Merits of Action Research. 
Administrative Science Quarterly Vol 23 No 4, pp. 582-603. 
Experian. (2019). 2019 Global Identity and Fraud Report. Experian Information Solutions, 
Inc. 
FedRAMP. (2018, May 05). about us. Retrieved from fedramp: 
https://www.fedramp.gov/about/ 
Ferraiolo, H., Cooper, D. A., Regenscheid, A. R., Scarfone, K. A., & Souppaya, M. P. (2016). 
Best Practices for Privileged User PIV Authentication. NIST Pubs. 
doi:https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.CSWP.04212016 
Gates, M. (2017). Blockchain: Ultimate Guide to Understanding Blockchain, Bitcoin, 
Cryptocurrencies, smart contracts adn the future of money. Wise Fox Publishing. 
Google. (2019, 09 March). Near Field Communication Overview. Retrieved from Android 
Developers: https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/connectivity/nfc 
Google. (2019, October 5). Titan Security key. Retrieved from Google Cloud: 
https://cloud.google.com/titan-security-key 
Google. (2019, August 7). Turn on 2-Step Verification. Retrieved from Google Account Help: 
https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/185839?hl=en 
Grassi, P. A., Fenton, J. L., Lefkovitz, N. B., Choong, Y.-Y., Greene, K. K., Danker, J. M., & 
Theofanos, M. F. (2017, June). NIST Special Publication 800-63A. Retrieved from 
NIST: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-63a 
Gritzalis, D. N. (n.d.). User-aided reader revocation in PKI-based RFID systems. Journal of 
Computer Security, pp. 1147-1172. 
Hansmann, U., Nicklous, M. S., Schack, T., & Seliger, F. (2000). Smart Card Application 
Development Using Java. Berlin: Springer. 
IETF. (2019, March 09). About. Retrieved from IETF: https://www.ietf.org/ 
IETF. (2019, march 10). Internet X.509 Public key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile. 
Retrieved from IETF: https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2459.txt 
Johannes A. buchmann, E. K. (2013). Introduction to Public Key Infrastructures. New York: 
Springer. 
Identity, Credential, and Access Management Framework 60 
 
Kshetri, N. (n.d.). Can blockchain stregthen the internet of things. IT Professional, 19(4), pp. 
68-72. doi:https://doi.org/10.1109/MITP.2017.3051335 
L. Bosnjak, J. S. (2018). Brute-force and dictionary attack on hashed real-world passwords. 
2018 41st International Conventnion on Information and Communication Technology, 
Electronics and Microelectronics (MIPRO), 1161-1166. 
doi:10.23919/MIPRO.2018.8400211 
Leonard, H. (2012, December 5). BII Mobile Insights. Retrieved from More proof that the 
web is going mobile: https://www.businessinsider.com/the-world-is-going-mobile-
2012-12 
Ma, Y. (2011, August 4). Research on the solution of PKI interoperability based on validation 
authority. Proceedings from the 2011 International Conference on Computer Science 
and Service System (CSSS). 
Matsumoto, S. &. (2017). IKP: turning PKI around with decentralized automated incentives. 
Proceedings from the 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 410-426. 
Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2017.57 
Matsumoto, S. R. (n.d.). Authentication challenges in a global environment. ACM 
Transactions on Privacy and Security, pp. 1-38. 
Mayes, K., & Markantonakis, K. (2017). Smart Cards, Tokens, Security, and Applications 
(second edition). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. 
NXP. (2019, September 25). Products. Retrieved from NXP: https://www.nxp.com/ 
Oxford. (2019, Oct 29). Identity. Retrieved from Lexico: 
https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/identity 
Paar, C., & Pelzl, J. (2010). Understanding Cryptography. New York : Springer. 
Paul A. Grassi, J. L. (2017). Digital Identity Guidelines. National Institute of Standards and 
Technology . National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication. 
doi:https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-63-3 
Plos, T. H. (n.d.). Security-enabled near-field communication tag with flexible architecture 
supporting asymmetric cryptography. IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale 
Integration Systems, pp. 1965-1974. 
Ragjendran, B. (2017). Evolution of PKI Ecosystem. 2017 International Conference on 
Public Key Infrastructure and Its Applications (PKIA), 9-10. 
Identity, Credential, and Access Management Framework 61 
 
Rahoof, P. N. (2017, April 24). Trust structure in public key infrastructure. Proceedings of the 
2017 2nd International Conference on Anti-Cyber Crimes. 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1109/Anti-Cybercrime.2017.7905295 
Rankl, W., & Effing, W. (2010). Smart Card Handbook. West Sussex, United Kingdom: John 
Wiley & Sons Ltd. 
Remme. (2019, September 15). Remme Protocol Documentation. Retrieved from Remme: 
http://docs.remme.io 
Rivera, R., Robledo, J. G., Larios, V. M., & Avalos, J. M. (2017). How Digital Identity on 
Blockchain can contribute in a smart city environment. 2017 International Smart 
Cities Conference (ISC2), 1-4. 
Robey, C. (2017). Whom doyou trust part 2 blockchain technology & smart contracting. 
Contract Management, pp. 18-27. 
Roman-tik. (2019 , September 12). Remmeauth protocol. Retrieved from Github: 
https://github.com/Remmeauth/remprotocol 
Samsung. (2019, September 16). The Samsung Knox Platform. Retrieved from Samsung 
Knox Documents: https://docs.samsungknox.com/knox-platform-for-
enterprise/admin-guide/why-use-knox.htm#h2_0 
Seffers, G. I. (2017, August). DISA Moves Beyond Conventional Biometrics. SIGNAL, 27-
28. Retrieved from www.afcea.org/signal 
Stokkink, Q., & Pouwelse, J. (2018). Deployment of a Blockchain-Based Self-Sovereign 
Identity. IEEE Conference on Internet of Things, Green Computing and 
Communications, Cyber, Physical and Social Computing, Smart Data, Blockchain, 
Computer and Information Technology, Congress on Cybermatics, (pp. 1336-1342). 
U.S. Government. (2019, June 06). PIV Usage Guides. Retrieved from ID Management: 
https://piv.idmanagement.gov/ 
United States Government. (2019, Oct 24). PIV Usage Guides. Retrieved from ID 
Management: https://piv.idmanagement.gov/ 
Vaishnavi, V. K., & Keuchler, Jr, W. (2015). Design Science Research Methods and Patterns 
Innovating Information and Communication Technology. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. 
Identity, Credential, and Access Management Framework 62 
 
Verizon. (2018). 2018 Data Breach Investigations Report. Verizon . Retrieved from 
https://enterprise.verizon.com/resources/reports/DBIR_2018_Report_execsummary.pd
f 
Verizon. (2019). 2019 Data Breach Investigations Report. Retrieved from 
https://enterprise.verizon.com/resources/reports/2019-data-breach-investigations-
report.pdf 
WatchGuard. (2018). Internet Security Report Q2 2018.  
White, A. K. (2018). Blockchain: Discover The Technology Behind Smart Contracts, Wallets, 
Mining, and Cryptocurrency. Abraham K White. 
Wieringa, R. (2014). Design Science Methodolgy. New York: Springer. 
wshbair, & alyakubov. (2019, August 2). pki-blockchain. Retrieved from github: 
https://github.com/snt-sedan/pki-blockchain 
Yakubov, A. S. (n.d.). A blockchain-based PKI management framework. Proceedings from 
IEEE/IFIP Network Operations and Management Symposium. 
Yubico. (2019, August 12). YubiKey for Mobile. Retrieved from Yubico: http://yubico.com 
ZDNet. (2018, May 05). 2017s biggest hacks, leaks, and data breaches. Retrieved from 
ZDNet: https://www.zdnet.com/pictures/biggest-hacks-leaks-and-data-breaches-
2017/21/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Identity, Credential, and Access Management Framework 63 
 
APPENDIX A: YUBIKEY 
YubiKey 5 NFC 
YubiKey is really easy to set up to use to protect Google accounts. I’ve set mine up to 
use with all of my accounts. I utilize the Yubikey on both my desktop and my mobile device. 
 
Turn on 2-Step Verification 
First turn on 2-step verification. Go to your google account and on the left navigation 
panel, click security. On the signing in to Google panel, click 2-step verification (Google, 
2019). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16: YubiKey 5 NFC 
 
 
 
Add a Security Key 
While logged into your Google account, go to Security Key under 2-Step. 
Click Add Security Key.  
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Figure 17: Add Security Key 
Choose USB or Bluetooh security key from the list.  
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Figure 18: Choose Your Security Key 
 
Next you’ll be asked to ensure your YubiKey is with you but not connected. Then 
click next. 
Identity, Credential, and Access Management Framework 66 
 
 
Figure 19: Ensure YubiKey is with you but not connected 
 
When prompted insert your YubiKey into a USB port on the computer. Then touch the 
gold disk that is lit up on your YubiKey. 
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Figure 20: Instructions to register YubiKey 
Your YubiKey will be registered. Assign a name for your Yubikey and click done. 
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Figure 21: Security Key Registered 
 
Logging into Your Google Account 
Now that a security key is registered with your google account, to log in on a 
computer you insert your Yubikey and touch it. To log in from a mobile device, you just tap 
your YubiKey (Yubico, 2019).  
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APPENDIX B: REMME 
Installing Remme 
All previous version of Remme Protocol must be uninstalled before installing again.  
 
Uninstall Binaries 
$ sudo dpkg -r remnode 
 
 
Step 1: Install Binaries 
On Ubuntu 18.04: 
$ wget 
https://github.com/Remmeauth/remprotocol/releases/download/v0.1.0/remmeprotocol_0.1.0-
ubuntu-18.04_amd64.deb && \ 
      sudo dpkg -i ./remmeprotocol_0.1.0-ubuntu-18.04_amd64.deb 
 
Step 2: Boot node and wallet 
 
Start remvault 
$ remvault & 
You will see an output similar to the one below: 
info  2019-08-12T13:16:38.388 remvault  http_plugin.cpp:625           add_handler          ] add 
api url: /v1/remvault/stop 
info  2019-08-12T13:16:38.389 remvault  http_plugin.cpp:625           add_handler          ] add 
api url: /v1/node/get_supported_apis 
info  2019-08-12T13:16:38.389 remvault  wallet_api_plugin.cpp:73      plugin_startup       ] 
starting wallet_api_plugin 
info  2019-08-12T13:16:38.389 remvault  http_plugin.cpp:625           add_handler          ] add 
api url: /v1/wallet/create 
info  2019-08-12T13:16:38.389 remvault  http_plugin.cpp:625           add_handler          ] add 
api url: /v1/wallet/create_key 
info  2019-08-12T13:16:38.389 remvault  http_plugin.cpp:625           add_handler          ] add 
api url: /v1/wallet/get_public_keys 
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Press enter to continue. 
Start remnode 
This command loads all the basic plugins, set the server address, enable CORS (with 
no restrictions and development logging) and add some contract debugging and logging. 
$ remnode -e -p rem \ 
      --plugin eosio::producer_plugin \ 
      --plugin eosio::chain_api_plugin \ 
      --plugin eosio::http_plugin \ 
      --access-control-allow-origin='*' \ 
      --contracts-console \ 
      --http-validate-host=false \ 
      --verbose-http-errors >> remnode.log 2>&1 & 
 
Note: In the above configuration, CORS is enabled for * for development purposes only, you 
should never enable CORS for * on a node that is publicly accessible! 
 
Step 3: check that remnode is producing blocks 
Run the following command: 
tail -f remnode.log 
 
You will see an output similar to the one below: 
 
1929001ms thread-0   producer_plugin.cpp:585       block_production_loo ] Produced block 
0000366974ce4e2a... #13929 @ 2018-05-23T16:32:09.000 signed by eosio [trxs: 0, lib: 
13928, confirmed: 0] 
1929502ms thread-0   producer_plugin.cpp:585       block_production_loo ] Produced block 
0000366aea085023... #13930 @ 2018-05-23T16:32:09.500 signed by eosio [trxs: 0, lib: 
13929, confirmed: 0] 
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1930002ms thread-0   producer_plugin.cpp:585       block_production_loo ] Produced block 
0000366b7f074fdd... #13931 @ 2018-05-23T16:32:10.000 signed by eosio [trxs: 0, lib: 
13930, confirmed: 0] 
1930501ms thread-0   producer_plugin.cpp:585       block_production_loo ] Produced block 
0000366cd8222adb... #13932 @ 2018-05-23T16:32:10.500 signed by eosio [trxs: 0, lib: 
13931, confirmed: 0] 
1931002ms thread-0   producer_plugin.cpp:585       block_production_loo ] Produced block 
0000366d5c1ec38d... #13933 @ 2018-05-23T16:32:11.000 signed by eosio [trxs: 0, lib: 
13932, confirmed: 0] 
1931501ms thread-0   producer_plugin.cpp:585       block_production_loo ] Produced block 
0000366e45c1f235... #13934 @ 2018-05-23T16:32:11.500 signed by eosio [trxs: 0, lib: 
13933, confirmed: 0] 
1932001ms thread-0   producer_plugin.cpp:585       block_production_loo ] Produced block 
0000366f98adb324... #13935 @ 2018-05-23T16:32:12.000 signed by eosio [trxs: 0, lib: 
13934, confirmed: 0] 
1932501ms thread-0   producer_plugin.cpp:585       block_production_loo ] Produced block 
00003670a0f01daa... #13936 @ 2018-05-23T16:32:12.500 signed by eosio [trxs: 0, lib: 
13935, confirmed: 0] 
1933001ms thread-0   producer_plugin.cpp:585       block_production_loo ] Produced block 
00003671e8b36e1e... #13937 @ 2018-05-23T16:32:13.000 signed by eosio [trxs: 0, lib: 
13936, confirmed: 0] 
1933501ms thread-0   producer_plugin.cpp:585       block_production_loo ] Produced block 
0000367257fe1623... #13938 @ 2018-05-23T16:32:13.500 signed by eosio [trxs: 0, lib: 
13937, confirmed: 0] 
 
Press ctrl  + c  to close an output. 
Step 4: Check the Wallet 
 
Run the following command, we need to validate the installation and check if wallet is 
working as intended: 
Identity, Credential, and Access Management Framework 72 
 
$ remcli wallet list 
You will see an output similar to the one below: 
$ Wallets: 
[] 
 
Step 5: Check remnode endpoints 
Run the following command, this will check that the RPC API  is working correctly: 
$ curl http://localhost:8888/v1/chain/get_info 
 
Installing Testchain 
Step 1: install binaries 
 Previous versions need to be uninstalled before installing. On Ubuntu 18.04: 
$ wget 
https://github.com/Remmeauth/remprotocol/releases/download/v0.1.0/remmeprotocol_0.1.0-
ubuntu-18.04_amd64.deb && \ 
      sudo dpkg -i ./remmeprotocol_0.1.0-ubuntu-18.04_amd64.deb 
 
Step 2: boot node and wallet 
 
Start remvault: 
$ remvault & 
 
You will see an output similar to the one below: 
info  2019-08-12T13:16:38.388 remvault  http_plugin.cpp:625           add_handler          ] add 
api url: /v1/remvault/stop 
info  2019-08-12T13:16:38.389 remvault  http_plugin.cpp:625           add_handler          ] add 
api url: /v1/node/get_supported_apis 
info  2019-08-12T13:16:38.389 remvault  wallet_api_plugin.cpp:73      plugin_startup       ] 
starting wallet_api_plugin 
info  2019-08-12T13:16:38.389 remvault  http_plugin.cpp:625           add_handler          ] add 
api url: /v1/wallet/create 
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info  2019-08-12T13:16:38.389 remvault  http_plugin.cpp:625           add_handler          ] add 
api url: /v1/wallet/create_key 
info  2019-08-12T13:16:38.389 remvault  http_plugin.cpp:625           add_handler          ] add 
api url: /v1/wallet/get_public_keys 
 
Press enter to continue 
 
Step 3: Download testchain settings 
 
$ wget https://testchain.remme.io/genesis.json 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 4: Create Configuration File 
 
Create data  and config  folders. 
$ mkdir data && mkdir config 
 
Create config/config.ini  and put the following settings into it: 
plugin = eosio::chain_api_plugin 
plugin = eosio::net_api_plugin 
http-server-address = 0.0.0.0:8888 
p2p-listen-endpoint = 0.0.0.0:9876 
p2p-peer-address = 167.71.88.152:9877 
verbose-http-errors = true 
These config options should get you into the basic operation mode with your node API 
available at port 8888 . P2p-peer-address points to the other nodes where to fetch the new 
blocks from (you may specify multiple entries, 167.71.88.152  is the address of a node hosted 
by Remme ). 
Start remnode 
Identity, Credential, and Access Management Framework 74 
 
$ remnode --config-dir ./config/ --data-dir ./data/ --delete-all-blocks --genesis-json 
genesis.json 
$ remnode --config-dir ./config/ --data-dir ./data/ >> remnode.log 2>&1 & 
 
The command above will run the node in the background and will save its output to 
the remnode.log  file. At this point, you must be ready to start and connect your node to the 
network. If your node is connected and synced, this command should return you the 
information about the chain: 
$ remcli get info 
  { 
      “server_version”: “96796929”, 
      “chain_id”: 
“93ece941df27a5787a405383a66a7c26d04e80182adf504365710331ac0625a7”, 
      “head_block_num”: 680455, 
      “last_irreversible_block_num”: 680121, 
      “last_irreversible_block_id”: 
“000a60b93d787895c905e36d7cf8d37a2bbed21d6f4b04f55645aefe459a32c0”, 
      “head_block_id”: 
“000a62074d3b6919262d90beecdffcc021fca03dc9ecd01ce4bfb91f8af36720”, 
      “head_block_time”: “2019-08-12T15:08:58.500”, 
      “head_block_producer”: “remproduce21”, 
      … 
  } 
remcli  (analog of cleos in EOSIO terms) is a command-line tool that has a rich 
variety of functions. It has nearly everything that you may need to interact with the 
blockchain. You may start getting familiar with it by running remcli –help . 
 
Step 5: Become a Block Producer 
 
To become a block producer you need to register your account via a system smart 
contract by calling the action regproducer , vote for someone or yourself, set up your node as 
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a full node (described above) and prepare it for block production (so it starts to produce 
blocks in case you make it to the top21 ). 
$ remcli system regproducer YOURACCOUNTNAME YOURPUBLICKEY 
https://yourdomain.com 
$ remcli system voteproducer prods YOURACCOUNTNAME YOURACCOUNTNAME 
 
In your node config file, add these options: 
plugin = eosio::producer_plugin 
plugin = eosio::producer_api_plugin 
producer-name = YOURACCOUNTNAME 
signature-provider = YOURPUBLICKEY=KEY:YOURPRIVATEKEY 
 
Once you run remnode, these config options should get you into block producer 
operation mode with your node. Once your block producer account gets into the top21 list, 
your node will automatically start producing blocks. Please pay attention that on the contrary 
to EOS  network, Block Producers  on testchain  are required to validate the token swaps 
between the chains and have to run an additional bot (along the remnode ) that monitors 
external blockchains (e.g. Ethereum ). 
Token swap 
Download sources: 
$ git clone -b block-producer-swap-bot --single-branch 
https://github.com/Remmeauth/remprotocol.git && \ 
      cd remprotocol/block_producer_swap_bot 
 
If you use Ubuntu 18.04 , install dependencies with the following command 
$ sudo ./scripts/ubuntu18.04_install.sh 
Create configuration file with the following command: 
$ nano ./config.ini 
Paste into the config file the following content: 
[NODES] 
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remnode=127.0.0.1:8888 
eth-provider=wss://ropsten.infura.io/ws/v3/<your infura id> 
[REM] 
swap-permission=<permission to authorize init swap actions>@active 
swap-private-key=<private key to sign init swap actions> 
 
Replace remnode, eth-provider, swap-permission, swap-private-key with your 
remnode host and port, a link to Ethereum node with websocket connection, your account and 
private key to authorize init swap actions (for example your block producer account name and 
private key for signing blocks). Tutorial for creating Infura API key. 
 
Save config file with Ctrl+O. Press Enter. Close config file with Ctrl+X. 
To start approving swaps run the following command: 
 
$ sudo ./scripts/run.sh >> swap.log 2>&1 & 
 
Monitoring 
Another option to check if your node has completed a correct setup is through 
monitoring. While starting the node, the monitoring has also been installed and started. 
Completing this step is required. 
Monitoring is a process of tracking application performance to detect and prevent 
issues that could occur with your application on a particular server. For the monitoring, we 
will use ELK stack . It is an open source, feature-rich metrics dashboard and graph editor 
stack. 
Step 1: install Docker 
Ubuntu 
$ curl -fsSL https://download.docker.com/linux/ubuntu/gpg | sudo apt-key add && \ 
      sudo add-apt-repository "deb [arch=amd64] https://download.docker.com/linux/ubuntu 
$(lsb_release -cs) stable" && \ 
      sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install docker-ce -y && \ 
      sudo curl -o /usr/local/bin/docker-compose -L 
"https://github.com/docker/compose/releases/download/1.23.2/docker-compose-$(uname -s)-
$(uname -m)" && \ 
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      sudo chmod +x /usr/local/bin/docker-compose 
 
Step 2: start the project 
Download the project and start it with the following command: 
$ git clone https://github.com/Remmeauth/protocol-monitoring && \ 
      cd protocol-monitoring && \ 
      sudo docker-compose -f docker-compose-linux.yml up -d && \ 
      curl -X POST "localhost:5601/api/saved_objects/_import" -H "kbn-xsrf: true" --form 
file=@export.ndjson 
 
Step 3: visualization and graphs  
Figure 22: Visualizations and Graphs on Dashboard 
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On confirming the stack is started, navigate to Kibana at http://<ip-address>:5601. To see 
visualization and graphs, go to Dashboards -> [Metricbeat System] Host overview ECS. 
 
Dashboards 
The toll named Metricbeat collects the following data: filesystem per host, system overview, 
CPU, filesystem, memory, network, overview, processes. 
 
Technical notes 
The following summarizes some important technical considerations:  
• The Elasticsearch instances uses a named volume esdata for data persistence between 
restarts. It exposes HTTP port 9200 for communication with other containers. 
• Environment variable defaults can be found in the file .env. 
• The Elasticsearch container has its memory limited to 1g. This can be adjusted using 
the environment parameter ES_MEM_LIMIT. Elasticsearch has a heap size of 1g. This 
can be adjusted through the environment variable ES_JVM_HEAP and should be set to 
50% of the ES_MEM_LIMIT. Users may wish to adjust this value on smaller machines. 
• The Elasticsearch password can be set via the environment variable ES_PASSWORD. 
This sets the password for the Elastic and Kibana user. 
• The Kibana container exposes the port 5601. 
• All configuration files can be found in the extracted folder ./config. 
• The Metricbeat container mounts both /proc and /sys/fs/cgroup on Linux. This 
allows Metricbeat to use the system module report on disk, memory, network and cpu 
of the host. 
• On systems with POSIX file permissions, all Beats configuration files are subject to 
ownership and file permission checks. The purpose of these checks is to prevent 
unauthorized users from providing or modifying configurations that are run by the Beat. 
The owner of the configuration file must be either root or the user who is executing 
the Beat process. The permissions on the file must disallow writes by anyone other than 
the owner. As we mount our configurations from the host, where the user is likely 
different than that used to run the container and the beat process, we disable this check 
for all beats with -strict.perms=false. 
Customizing the Stack 
With respect to the current example, we have provided a few simple entry points for 
customization: 
• The example includes an .env file listing environment variables which alter the 
behaviour of the stack. These environment variables allow the user to change: 
o ELASTIC_VERSION - the Elastic Stack version (default 7.2.0) 
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o ES_PASSWORD - the password used for authentication with the elastic 
user. This password is applied for all system users 
i.e. kibana and logstash_system. Defaults to changeme. 
o DEFAULT_INDEX_PATTERN - The index pattern used as the default 
in Kibana. Defaults to metricbeat-*. 
o ES_MEM_LIMIT - The memory limit used for 
the Elasticsearch container. Defaults to 1g. Consider reducing for 
smaller machines. 
o ES_JVM_HEAP - The Elasticsearch JVM heap size. Defaults to 1024m 
and should be set to half of the ES_MEM_LIMIT. 
• Modules and Configuration - All configuration to the containers is provided through a 
mounted ./config directory. Where possible, this exploits the dynamic configuration 
loading capabilities of Beats. For example, an additional module could be added by 
simply adding a file to the directory ./config/beats/metricbeat/modules.d/ in the required 
format. 
Shutting down the stack 
The following command will exit the containers and ensure they are shut down gracefully. 
$ sudo docker-compose -f docker-compose-linux.yml stop 
To remove all containers, including their mounted named volumes, use the following 
command: 
$ sudo docker-compose -f docker-compose-linux.yml down -v 
 
